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FOREWORD
Courses in formal legal education were established at
Notre Dame more than eighty years ago. Throughout
the years, the University's College of Law has insisted
that law cannot be divorced from morality. This prin-
ciple of thought and teaching has enabled us to remain
faithful to the Natural Law doctrine which was placed
by the American Founding Fathers as the standard of
all valid man-made law. Nevertheless, in most Amer-
ican law schools a purely pragmatic or materialistic
philosophy of law has long displaced Natural Law juris-
prudence and has exerted in our times a powerful in-
fluence upon the thinking of jurists, judges, and lawyers.
In 1947, the College of Law organized the Natural Law
Institute in order to extend the study of Natural Law
beyond the limits of the classroom. We are convinced
that an American law school today, aside from its re-
sponsibility in the training of future lawyers, has also a
duty to the legal profession and the public at large.
Through the Natural Law Institute, Notre Dame's Col-
lege of Law is trying to assist in the restoration of the
moral foundation upon which American law was orig-
inally built.
In four short years, the Institute has made gratifying
progress in discharging its main function. It has won
recognition as a focal point of Natural Law studies in
the United States. Its annual convocations have been
attended by legal scholars, judges, and lawyers from this
country and abroad. The papers read at these convoca-
tions have been published each year by the University
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Press. A special library of books on Natural Law, the
generous gift of Mr. Alvin A. Gould, sponsor of the con-
vocations since 1948, has been opened in the College of
Law, and its valuable materials will serve the ends of
productive scholarship in the study of Natural Law.
The present volume contains five papers read at the
Institute's 1950 convocation. Taken as a whole, they
demonstrate that the Natural Law is not a mystical
abstraction, the exclusive province of the academic
scholar unmindful of the day-to-day problems of the
legal practitioner. Nor is the Natural Law the peculiar
possession of the lawyer. Legal scholars, jurists, judges,
and lawyers alone cannot rescue American law from the
unfortunate routine of positivism and materialism. The
layman, too, must be made aware of the implications of
Natural Law doctrines and his voice must strengthen
the demand that morality be given back to law. It is
noteworthy, therefore, that two of the five papers in-
cluded in this volume are the products of non-lawyers.
It should hardly be necessary to point out again that
the idea of Natural Law is not uniquely Catholic, nor
even Christian. Two of the participants in the 1950
convocation were Protestant in religious affiliation; two
were Roman Catholics; one was a Jew. Yet their papers
show a common agreement founded on reason that in
Natural Law philosophy alone can we find a solid de-
fense of the assertion that certain "fundamental" rights
are inherent in man's nature and hence beyond destruc-
tive attack by hostile human authority.
We Americans are accustomed to speak with easy as-
surance about our precious "fundamental" rights. But
to call a right fundamental is not to answer the question
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why it is fundamental. And that is precisely the ques-
tion which a troubled generation is asking urgently of
those who make, interpret, and apply our laws. A jus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court has remarked
that in interpreting our Bill of Rights today, the purely
positive precedents set by the cases of other years are
often found unreliable because of changing conditions.
If that be so, then we are necessarily driven back to
first principles. In the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the first principles regarding human rights
were enunciated in the light of the Natural Law philos-
ophy. Before the State existed, God created man. Out
of the relationship of creature and Creator arose certain
rights. It is because of this relationship that our rights
are "inalienable"; and being thus inalienable they are
fundamental, as we say today. Such first principles of
the origin of human rights ought to function as stan-
dards to evaluate those human laws which necessarily
must be made to regulate the exercise of fundamental
rights. The papers in the present volume, discussing
such rights, exemplify the modem vitality of a retum to
the first principles of Natural Law.
The writer therefore feels warranted in repeating
here what he wrote as a foreword to the first volume of
the Natural Law Institute Proceedings four years ago:
The Natural Law is not an ideal, it is a reality. It
is not a product of men's minds; it is a product of
God's will. It is as real and as binding as the
statutes in the U. S. Code. It is not a mere ideal
toward which all statutes and court decisions and
systems of law should tend. The actuality is that
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any statute or court decision or system of law which
does not conform to natural law simply has no valid
binding force; it is inherently vitiated. It lacks an
element required for essential validity.
REVEREND JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, C.S.C.
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INTRODUCTION
The Natural Law is as old as Man himself. Ages ago
Chinese thinkers and Hebrew prophets, Greek philoso-
phers and Roman jurists caught the vision of a Supreme
Law transcending and therefore necessarily informing
the laws men make for men. From that Law resulted
certain basic human rights. These rights the State was
morally competent to implement and protect but not to
impair or destroy. Nor could the State's commands be
the sole criteria of right and wrong, for, independent of
the State there existed an objective standard, rationally
ascertainable, by which the final value of all human
laws can and must be tested.
What thus was seen so long ago "as in a glass darkly,"
Christianity brought into clearer focus, for Jesus Christ
came indeed "not to destroy but to fulfill." In the be-
ginning God created all things. As a Supremely Intel-
ligent Creator, He acted in accordance with a Divine
Plan. Christian philosophers termed that Plan - the
Eternal Law. Man, endowed by his Creator with an
intellect, free will and an immortal soul, can discover
through his own reason, unaided by direct Divine Rev-
elation, the primary dictates of the Eternal Law. These
dictates and what may be rationally inferred from them
constitute the Natural Law. Human or Positive Law
then performs its proper function when it conforms to
Natural Law, expressing it and supplementing it. Man,
moreover, since he is the creature of God, owes certain
I
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primary duties to his Creator. The rights correlative
to the full discharge of these duties are truly "unalien-
able." Man himself cannot voluntarily surrender them.
No human power can take them from him.
The world's history and literature for twenty-five
hundred years demonstrate the universality and vitality
of the appeal to Natural Law. Sophocles' Antigone
invoked the Natural Law as did England's martyred
Chancellor-Saint, Thomas More, twenty centuries later,
when each stood condemned by man-made statute. In
the seventeenth century English Protestant lawyers bred
in the same common law tradition as More, made the
Natural Law the basis of their restatement of English
Constitutionalism. In the same century the Dutch
Protestant, Grotius, erected the superstructure of mod-
em International Law on the Natural Law foundations
already solidly laid by the Spanish Catholic scholars -
Vitoria, the Dominican, and Suarez, the Jesuit.
In the United States the Natural Law became part
of the authentic fabric of American Constitutionalism
when Thomas Jefferson wove Natural Law principles
into the American Declaration of Independence. Suc-
ceeding generations of American law students began
their studies with the Natural Law until it was driven
from the curricula of most American law schools by
Pragmatism, Materialism and Secularism. Jurispru-
dence was then confined to the study of the history of
man-made laws alone or to the analysis of their purely
positive content. Such a Jurisprudence had logically no
reply when in our time the Totalitarian States assaulted
the basic dignity of the human personality. Their Juris-
prudence too, was a Pragmatic Jurisprudence divorced
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from Natural Law. At Nuremberg, Man, appalled at
the brutal conclusions to which amoral Jurisprudence
had led, demanded that Law be restored to its moral
foundations. How else could the indictment of the van-
quished enemy be consistently maintained?
Today Man again faces the threat of the Omni-
competent and Omnipotent State in which human rights
and duties have no higher source than the State's own
positive fiat and hence must give way if they block the
paths the State wills to follow. To meet the ominous
challenge of this "Absolute" of the State, Man today
has desperate need of an "Absolute" of his own. Can
that need be met by the reinvigoration of the Natural
Law doctrine in which the thinkers of the ages found an
"Absolute" for Man arising out of his essential nature as
the child of God and destined for an End beyond
the State?
To this question the Natural Law Institute of the
College of Law of the University of Notre Dame has
been humbly dedicated. What the College of Law itself
has been doing for decades in its regular courses the In-
stitute seeks to do on a wider scale - to investigate the
historical development of Natural Law doctrines, to
study their true relation to Positive Law, to restate
them in the light of current problems and thus to assist
in the restoration of Natural Law to the position of
eminence once universally accorded it by American
statesmen, jurists and lawyers.
The 1947 sessions of the Institute were devoted to an
exposition of the broad philosophical implications of
Natural Law doctrines. In 1948 the theme was their
historical development through the ages. In 1949 four
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distinguished scholars discussed the relations between
Natural Law and Common Law, Constitutional Law,
Canon Law and International Law.
The papers read at the 1950 Convocation of the In-
stitute and reprinted in this volume were concerned with
certain "rights" which we Americans call "fundamen-
tal,"- the right to liberty, the right to property, the
right to freedom of expression and the right to pursue
happiness. Does the Natural Law as the source of
human rights offer a true and solid explanation of what
men really mean when they call such rights "fundamen-
tal"? This was the central theme of the 1950 sessions.
The Editor of the Proceedings wishes to express deep
appreciation to the Reverend John J. Cavanaugh, c.s.c.,
President of the University of Notre Dame, to Clarence
E. Manion, Dean of the College of Law, to Mr. Alvin
A. Gould, sponsor of the 1950 Convocation, to Mr.
Robert J. Boyd, Student Chairman, to the faculty and
students of the College of Law and to all who assisted
in so many ways to make the Convocation a success.
EDWARD F. BARRETT,
Associate Professor of Law,
University of Notre Dame,
Editor.
THE SOURCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
George E. Sokolsky
(Columnist, author, lecturer; LL.D., University of Notre
Dame, 1946; Editor, Russian Daily News, Petrograd, 1917;
Assistant Editor, North China Star, Tientsin, China, 1918;
Editor, Far Eastern Review, 1927-1930; Author of Outlines
of Universal History; Tinder Box of Asia; Labor's Fight
for Power; We Jews; The American Way of Life. Contribu-
tor to New York Herald-Tribune, 1935-40; columnist, New
York Sun and other newspapers since 1940).

THE SOURCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
W HEN Dean Manion proposed that I should be pres-ent today to discuss s  broad a topic as has been
assigned to me, "The Source of Human Rights," my
secretary, who joins my wife in impeding my peregrina-
tions in space and thought, asked:
"What will you do among all those philosophers and
theologians?"
In effect, she posed the problem of my butting into
your business which is to discover the truth.
But are human rights not also my business? Are they
not everyone's business? Each day, my little missive of
700 words or thereabout goes to some 20,000,000 read-
ers, who are at liberty to look at it, to reject it, or even
to read it. The responsibility inherent in the task of
speaking to so many is surely to try to discover what the
truth may be and even what the source of the truth
may be.
There are, of course, those who always know pre-
cisely what the truth is and forecast it as though they
were prophets. Not being Israelites, the gift of prophecy
is not in them and only too often they substitute bias,
prejudice and even bigotry for truth. Not being re-
strained by the wisdom of the ages, which always coun-
sels caution, they rush speedily in all directions until
they meet themselves moving from left to right.
Our task today is to commune with each other in the
hope that out of our labors may come some insight into
7
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the meaning of that divine intelligence which must
guide us or we are lost. Perhaps we shall only see the
light through a keyhole; perhaps the door will be
opened full and wide to us. Whichever it may be, let
us approach our problem in the spirit of search and in
due humility. For we cannot be sure that we know the
path, although we are certain of the goal we seek.
I am not of your communion and therefore I must
approach our problem from my own position. It is a
glorious day in our land when a Roman Catholic uni-
versity invites me, a Jew, to speak to you on a subject
so dear and close to your hearts and minds. It is sym-
bolic of our country that in these days when intellectual
and spiritual darkness fills so much of the earth - and
makes it a void - children of God of differing faiths
gather under this roof to investigate His revealed words
and to seek a common conclusion as to His immediate
guidance for our nation and our times.
Recognizing fully my unfitness and lack of prepara-
tion for such a task, I nevertheless accepted the invita-
tion, not as a scholar but as a journalist; not as a man
of letters but as a reporter; not as a Christian but as
a Jew.
I
The problem posed before us is obviously the meaning
of the first two paragraphs of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, of July 4, 1776, which announced the crea-
tion of a new nation upon our soil. These paragraphs,
as you well know, read:
"When in the course of human events, it becomes
necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands
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which have connected them with another, and to assume
among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal
station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God
entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind requires that they should declare the causes which
impel them to the separation.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Cre-
ator with certain unalienable rights, that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . .."
We speak in the inspiration of those words, and if we
apply them to these days, we never depart from the
original concept of our nation.
II
Others will speak on life, liberty and happiness. My
task is to deal with "the laws of nature and of na-
ture's God."
It must seem curious that the revolutionists of 1776
wrote such a declaration at all. Why did they go to all
the trouble of basing their claims for independence
upon a philosophy of life? Why did they not shriek:
"Down with the king !"
"Hang King George III !"
"No taxation without representation."
"Murder the tax collectors!"
"All power to the workers and peasants 1"
"Kill the priests!"
Similar slogans have been the battle cries of revo-
lutions from Spartacus to Lenin. The masses have been
aroused by politicians to change rulers, or to substitute
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one class for another, or to redistribute wealth or to
divide property, in times of revolution. How different,
for instance, was this American revolution from the
French revolution, or from the 1848 revolutions in
Europe, or from the Russian or Chinese or Turkish
revolutions in our century!
Compare, for instance, these two paragraphs from the
Declaration of Independence with the Communist
Manifesto of Marx and Engels in 1848, where it is said:
"The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class struggles.
"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and
serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor
and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one an-
other, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now
open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a
revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in
the common ruin of the contending classes."
Or consider these paragraphs in the Manifesto:
".. . Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist
revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but
their chains. They have a world to win.
"Working men of all countries, unite !"
First, then, we need to grasp and understand the
philosophic calm of our historical ancestors, who could,
when men were already dying for a cause, sit down to
write a document which did not exhort to violence but
rather to an appraisal of man's place in the cosmos, to
an understanding of his relationship to nature's law and
nature's God. It is impossible, in view of what they
wrote and what they placed first and uppermost in
their statement, to doubt that theirs was a world of
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noble ideas- they fought for what in these days of
rather twisted language, we call an ideology. They re-
lated themselves to natural law- to the law of God.
revealed to all mankind, to all who would listen to the
word and who would be guided by it.
This we cannot doubt or deny, for it is there for all
to see in the first fifty words of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. We need not quarrel over whether Jefferson
and Franklin were Deists and not Christians; these words
relate them to the vast body of human beings, no matter
how divergent their paths seem to be, who walk in the
same direction toward the same goal. Perhaps Alexan-
der Hamilton best expressed the thought of all when
he wrote:
"The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rum-
maged for among old parchments or musty records.
They are written as with a sunbeam, in the whole Vol-
ume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself
and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power."
Or, when arguing for a political conclusion, Hamil-
ton wrote:
Of this nature are the maxims in geometry,
that 'The whole is greater than its part; two things
equal to the same are equal to one another; two straight
lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are
equal to each other.' Of the same nature are these
other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot
be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to
be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to
be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be
no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose
which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are
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other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they
cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet
such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in
themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and un-
sophisticated dictates of common-sense, that they chal-
lenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a
degree of force and conviction almost equally irre-
sistible."
Then he said:
cc.*. The infinite divisibility of matter, or, in other
words, the infinite divisibility of a finite thing, extending
even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among
geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to com-
mon-sense than any of those mysteries in religion,
against which the batteries of infidelity have been so
industriously leveled."
It could not have been thought otherwise in the
American colonies, for those who came to them from
Europe, foreswore material comfort to associate them-
selves with a life devoted to God, as they, in their day.
understood such a life. Although in 1776, they had been
on this continent more than a century and a half, they
had not yet been conquered by the world of things, nor
had their spirit been subdued by comforts and securi-
ties. They still sought God's guidance and resting their
political case, not upon the laws of parliament or the
laws of nations, but upon the laws of God, they were
able to think in terms of the value of human life, the
essence of human liberty which is free will, the power
to choose between good and evil, and happiness which
is only attainable in the pursuit of the good and or-
derly life.
THE SOURCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
III
We, in our day, are purse-proud in our vast discov-
eries. We know so much. We know that the greatest
physical power is lodged in the small, unseeable atom.
We know how to explode what we cannot see, hear or
feel. We can measure and weigh these imperceptible
objects and we can contain them, convey them and use
them. We have discovered how to transmute that
which has one form and character into something alto-
gether different. We do not quite understand what we
are doing, but we do them and the results are as antici-
pated in the calculations. It is a notable achievement
and you here at Notre Dame have contributed your
share to the attainment of unbelievable goals-much of
it, of course, on faith, in which realm the scientist is not
very remote from the theologian.
But what does all this tell us about living? We have
discovered how things live through the natural sciences,
but we have not found the good life by that process.
In fact, during this century when science has moved so
rapidly that from Darwin to Einstein, more progress
has been made than during the remaining seven or
eight thousand years of written history, we have not
even budged in the extremely important fields of morals
and ethics.
Matthew Arnold caught the error of a science with-
out moral direction when he said:
"... Culture is then properly described not as having
its origin in curiosity, but as having its origin in the
love of perfection; it is a study of perfection. It moves
by the force, not merely or primarily of the scientific
14 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and
social passion for doing good. As, in the first view of
it, we took for its worthy motto Montesquieu's words:
'To render an intelligent being yet more intelligent!'
so, in the second view of it, there is no better motto
which it can have than these words of Bishop Wilson:
'To make reason and the will of God prevail!'"
From Darwin to Einstein, we have gathered together
billions of facts; yet the relations of man to man, of son
to father, of brother to brother, of neighbor to neigh-
bor, of citizen to state, of nation to nation, still stand
upon the great thought and revelation of such minds as
Hammurabi, Moses, Jesus, Plato, Aristotle, Confucius.
Gotama, Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas.
How does it happen that little Palestine and Syria
and Greece understood so much and we so little? Is
it possible or believable that in the realm of human
relations all that needs to be known has forever been
known?
That is, indeed, a curious question. Yet, this also is
curious: That when we move away, in any civilization,
from certain basic precepts of living, long ago enunci-
ated, that civilization withers on the vine, and often
dies. Why is it that nearly all peoples, of whatever
state of development, even savages, approach one aphor-
ism in much the same language? The question is, what
is the fundamental relationship of man to man? And
no matter how that is pondered, the answer comes out
the same. Let me give you a few examples:
".. . In the Indian Mahabharata . . . , it is said:
-'Let no man do to another that which would be re-
pugnant to himself; this is the sum of righteousness; the
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rest is according to inclination. In refusing, in bestow-
ing, in regard to pleasure and to pain, to what is agree-
able, a man obtains the proper rule by regarding the
case as like his own.'
"Similar words are ascribed to Confucius. When
Tsze-Kung asked if there is any one word which may
serve as a rule of practice for all one's life, the master
answered, 'Is not reciprocity such a word? What you
do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.' And
in another utterance Confucius showed that the rule had
for him not only a negative, but a positive form. He
said that, in the way of the superior man, there are four
things to none of which he himself had as yet attained;
to serve his father as he would require his son to serve
him, to serve his prince as he would require his minister
to serve him, to serve his elder brother as he would
require his younger brother to serve him, and to set the
example in behaving to a friend as he would require
the friend to behave to him.'"
".. .Love of man was considered by Hillel as the
kernel of the entire Jewish teaching. When a heathen
who wished to become a Jew asked him for a summary
of the Jewish religion in the most concise terms, Hillel
said: 'What is hateful to thee, do not unto thy fellow
man: This is the whole law; the rest is mere com-
mentary ... $)
And all this culminates perhaps in these three state-
ments of the case, in a crescendo of simplicity and af-
firmation:
"Jesus said ...Thou shalt love the Lord Thy God
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with
all thy mind.
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"This is the first and great commandment.
"And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thyself.
"On these two commandments hang all the law and
the prophets."
This we call the Golden Rule.
It is universal, unchangeable, eternal. It is rea-
sonable and full of logic. From it there can be no
plausible deviation. It is complete.
But its universality is what is so amazing. We speak
of races as savage, wild, uneducated, uncivilized. Yet,
they discovered this rule of life, even as they discovered
mother-love and the stars and the periodicity of life.
As man began to think and believe, this rule of life
came to him and with it, gradually, other rules which
were finally incorporated in what my ancestors called
the Ten Commandments. This is the essence of re-
vealed truth.
IV
Millions of laws have been written by rulers and
legislators based upon the Ten Commandments; and
then they had to write millions of other laws providing
penalties for their infraction. Somehow the spirit of
man is never bound by the laws that man makes, the
imagination always playing upon the prospects, and
even joys, of evasion. It is like the income tax which
everyone calculates from the premise of deductions
which often are euphemisms for evasions or avoidances.
Capital punishment is still imposed for murder as it
used to be for theft, but men murder and steal without
fear of punishments, trusting that their own ingenuity
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or their lawyer's wiles will save them. Adultery has
ceased to be a crime; it has rather become a source of
great pride, particularly when noted and amply adver-
tised by some of my colleagues. As for bearing false
witness, it happens in the best of places and has even
become the most used weapon of statecraft.
Your bishops recently said:
"In recent decades, striking advances have been made
in meeting the child's physical, emotional and social
needs; but his moral and religious needs have not been
met with the same solicitude and understanding. As a
result, many of our children today betray confusion and
insecurity because these un-met needs are fundamental
to the harmonious development of their whole nature."
But why limit this judgment to the child, for is he
not father of the man? The child, who factually pro-
vides the generations that must succeed us upon this
soil, has suddenly become a national problem. We em-
phasize juvenile delinquents, but how many mothers
have wept bitter tears over their daughters in our col-
leges who have taken Kinsey's book as their bible and
how many fathers have wondered at the products of an
amoral education which brings forth their sons as grown
men but not as gentlemen in the sense that they know
right from wrong absolutely?
And so we come to the crux of this problem which
is that the family system, the hard core of the American
civilization, as it has been of every great civilization, has
collapsed. Too many divorces, too many broken homes,
too much comparative morality, too great uncertainty
- these have so confused both parents and children
that they are at a loss to understand the proprieties of
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human relations. They literally know not what they do.
This uncertainty in the husband-wife and the parent-
child relationship appears in almost all phases of our
social lives. We literally do not know what we are
doing. We act without direction. We move without
guidance. We possess the charts, but we either read
them as though they were of strange and even dead
languages or we preserve them as curiosities. We do not
live by them.
Even many who assume that they are devoted to the
laws of life only too often separate thought from action;
that is, they do not apply what they believe to be true
to their private and public lives. It is possible, not only
possible but almost usual, to encounter a devout politi-
cian who has perhaps studied philosophy at a Catholic
university, yet who does what other politicians do who
are neither devout nor knowledgeable.
With such, devotion has become routine; prayer mere
ritual: education a duty performed. They have not
learned to apply the laws of life to life itself. They
engage in corruption; they practise fraud and deceit;
they abandon truth because they are able to separate
what they call the practical from the impractical, which
is as much an error of commission as it is of termin-
ology.
For what can be more practical in every day appli-
cation than the guidance of God, as expressed in Nat-
ural Law, the abandonment of which produces chaos
and confusion. A politician may find some personal
advantage in the deception of the electorate, but the
truth will out. The author of confusion is soon enough
identified. If alive, he is defeated by his deceits; if
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dead, he becomes an object of historic vilification. The
Korean war is a proof of that axiom.
V
For truth is eternal and unchangeable and is ap-
plicable to all times, places and circumstances. Truth
is the law of nature and of nature's God and is immut-
able and everlasting.
Is this too broad an assertion?
Let us think in terms of historic transactions, made
by practical men to achieve some immediate purpose,
but based upon deceit not only of those who were parties
to the transactions but of the peoples they represented.
Munich, Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam - these are but a
few of the conferences which since 1938 have brought
upon mankind war and tyranny and death. We are
today reaping the thorns and thistles sown at these
meetings from which the law of God was always absent.
Who can say that what was done at Teheran in Novem-
ber 1943 can be justified by the blood and death of
December 1950? Who can say that the rape of Poland
and the abandonment of China- both denials of the
sworn word- will pass into history as forgotten sins?
Yet, those practical men did not fear the conse-
quences of their own positiveness. They risked greatly
because they risked nothing that was important to them
-namely the truth. And to the world, their retreat
from principle has brought nothing but tears and
mourning throughout the world.
The test of their system came with the arrest of
Archbishop Stepinac, not because he is a Roman cleric
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nor even because he is a man of religion, of any reli-
gion. The test rame because no government, no major
nation protested the impropriety of his trial and im-
prisonment as a violation of truth. So practical had we
all become that nothing really mattered except the
avoidance of responsibility. So the betrayal of Poland,
of China, of Czechoslovakia, of Hungary set the stage
for the slaughter of our sons in Korea. Nations, like
men, cannot betray the law of God, without suffering
the consequences of their errors. For an historical error
sets a course which only a moral response can alter.
VI
And so I come to the end of this discourse, but I am
still faced by the problem of bringing it together into a
statement of the relationship of man to the law of life.
Were man inanimate, he could, like the mountain,
suffer erosion. The mountain possesses no will. It can-
not move to a climate where it can control wind and
weather. Its status is determined by its environment.
Man is not only an animate creature, but he pos-
sesses personality and will and conscience. He is close
to God, for he is a moral creature who can know right
from wrong and can do what is right and wrong. Even
more, he possesses that fierce check-valve, conscience,
which fights him at every turn. He is capable of cleans-
ing himself and of contrition. He can start anew and
build anew. He possesses such qualities as hope, ambi-
tion, humility. He can cultivate the gentle nature of
charity and compassion. He may be mean, petty, unfor-
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giving, vindictive. He may grow into a glorious creature
so capable of love that even his enemies are beloved,
for is not God the father of the foe as of the friend?
Such a creature of mind and spirit requires guidance,
lest his very qualities consume him. The brilliant may
be evil. The competent may be thieves. The strong
may be murderers. The genius may be an adulterer.
Guidance alone can save man from the excesses of his
own nature.
But what guidance? Whose guidance? Shall I listen
to the creature who like myself is blindly seeking the
answer and who experiments with this or that? Shall I
say that out of laboratory or clinic will come my an-
swer? Whom can I trust? Whose formula has been
tested? Who can lead me forward to the good life?
Whose wisdom can lead our beloved country back to
its very sound foundations which so many have ex-
perimentally deserted?
And there is the answer in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence: To nature's law and nature's God, to the
Natural Law. Natural- because it is the rule of the
cosmos, eternal and constant: Law- because it is the
total history of man, the application of all human ex-
perience, everywhere and at all times. God's law --
because it was revealed by Him to man as a guide to
life, to all men on whatever level of development.
This is our chart. This is our guide. This is the
beam upon which ,e can soar to safety, to a sure and
happy landing.
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THE NATURAL LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO LIBERTY
T HE subject assigned to me for discussion is one of
first importance. It is said that Lord Acton spent
almost all his adult life preparing for the great task of
writing a thesis on Liberty; that he wrote much in pre-
paring for the task, but died before realizing that am-
bition. I am happy to discuss the subject assigned me
and it is not modesty on my part that prompts me to
say that my indifferent scholarship will not permit me
to speak as a philosopher. Happily, there are those on
our program who properly and preeminently can lay
claim to that distinction. It is my hope none the less
that what I have to say will appeal to the average mind
and will be considered sound and reasonable.
My thesis is "The Natural Law and the Right to
Liberty." In discussing any subject, it is first necessary
to define the terms. Law is an ordinance of reason
given by him who has charge of the community and
promulgated. Natural Law is also described by St.
Thomas Aquinas as "the participation in the eternal
law by rational creatures." The average man thinks
of Natural Law as that law which is graven on the
tablets of the heart. It is moral law, prescribed by our
rational nature, independent of the Ten Command-
ments, independent of the pronouncements, dogmas or
teachings of any particular church, and independent of
any ruler or government, constitution or statute. It
exists in our very nature, so that rationally we know
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there is a right and a wrong; an objective good and
evil; and that in the exercise of the mind perceiving
good and evil, we are impelled to do good and avoid
evil.
The Natural Law postulates the existence of a per-
sonal God, an ens a se, and that we are rational crea-
tures created by God, in His own image and likeness,
with free will and a yearning for happiness which we
believe will only be satisfied by a return to God Who
is infinitely perfect. That is the only rational meaning
that can be given to the universe.
It follows then that we are the creatures of God.
Every creature has an end, a purpose, and God guides
all creatures to their appointed ends by their natures,
their principles of operation. This definite plan is the
eternal law. It is likewise so in the physical world,
where we observe the sublime order of the universe-
the succession of the seasons, the movement of the earth,
the position of the sun, moon, stars and other planets.
No one denies that such physical natural laws govern
the universe in its magnificently precise order. There is
no unrestrained freedom. So compelling is the order in
the universe through its physical laws that the mind of
man, unaided, reverently realizes that there is a Guid-
ing Hand, that there is a First Cause- God.
Man, too, in the plan of his Creator has his end and
destiny which must be worked out by his reason and his
will. His intellect and will apprehend the true and the
good, and by his nature man seeks after what is good.
Good is to be done, and the contrary or evil is to be
avoided.
The materialists reject the idea of Natural Law as a
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pious code of the Christian and other religions. History
refutes this attitude. The ancients: Xenophon, Plato,
Sophocles, Demosthenes, Cicero, recognized a standard
of good and evil antecedent to positive law. In our own
country when it emerged from a colonial state into an
independent nation, the founding fathers, Washington,
Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, James Wilson, Otis, and
the rest, grounded their political philosophy in the
Natural Law.
Their primary principle of law and liberty begins
with the reverent recognition of God as its source. The
second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence
is an unequivocal acknowledgment of Natural Law
principles:
"We hold these truths to be self evident, that all
men are created equal; they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness;
that to secure these rights, governments are insti-
tuted among men deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed. That whenever any
form of government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or
abolish it and to institute new government, laying
its foundations on such principles and organizing
its powers in such form as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness."
This passage contains the substance of our philosophy
of government. In it we are called the children of God,
our Creator, who gave us those inalienable rights,
among them liberty. It bespeaks our human dignity,
THE NATURAL LAW AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 27
an endowment from our Creator, and it enshrines the
whole idea of the freedom of man.
Those rights, while three-fold, are really in union,
one with the others, to live and be free, to pursue and
attain everlasting happiness.
Within the last few years, the indictments tried at
Nuremberg were based on spiritual realities in law
beyond any positive law then in existence. The first
count of the indictment charged in effect a common
plan or conspiracy for a period of years prior to May 8,
1945 and the commission of overt criminal acts against
humanity, crimes against peace, carrying out of ruthless
wars, deportation of men and women for slave labor,
enslavement, inhuman acts, etc. The international
agreements then in existence which denounced aggres-
sive war, did no more than state an opinion about these
evils. The point is that there was no definite law, i.e.
positive statute, as we know it, which made these acts
criminal, unless these acts violated the principles of
Natural Law. The charge at the Nuremberg trials was
really that the defendants violated human rights and the
indictment and prosecution proceeded upon the theory
that the things done were evil in themselves, and con-
trary to the laws of humanity and the conscience of
mankind.
Those who deny the Natural Law usually proceed on
the theory that morality and legality are the same. That
which is legal is moral. This doctrine is open to grave
objections. If morality and legality be one and the
same, then that which is considered evil in itself, mur-
der or any heinous crime, could be made lawful by
statute. Murder does not cease to be murder just be-
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cause it has the approval of a dictator or a totalitarian
state. Reason revolts at the idea of murder being virtu-
ous and approved, or love and respect for parents being
evil and forbidden. If it be said that no such absurd
laws will come into being- we may ask, why should
they not, unless they are at variance with the universal
conviction of mankind about right and wrong?
It is not my purpose to include in this paper proof of
the Natural Law. That has been ably done in previous
years. This is the fourth Meeting of the Natural Law
Institute at Notre Dame and these conferences have
resulted in a most remarkable revival of interest in the
study and consideration of Natural Law and its implica-
tions in recent years. It has brought to your academic
halls many outstanding scholars and legal philosophers.
In this great movement Notre Dame has taken the lead.
The work published in these proceedings was of the
high calibre one has grown to expect of Notre Dame.
To continue with our thesis: Liberty, according to
the scholastics, means the absence of internal necessity
toward one course of action; that the power and exer-
cise of choice is left to the free will to act in one way
or to act in another, when all the elements for proper
determination are present. This is human liberty. It
does not and cannot mean absence of obligation to
others. Right and obligation are obviously correlative.
Natural Law imposes obligations that are moral, and
civil authority by positive law imposes civil obligations.
In both fields man is free physically to reject them. He
may defy God, violate the moral law, just as he may
disobey the laws and ordinances of the community and
the State. Under an alleged liberty, men have recourse
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to license, i.e., the absence of all restraint, which claims
the right to do anything and everything one desires.
This, of course, is not freedom but chaos or even slav-
ery. Bossuet describes it thus "Where everybody does
what he likes, nobody does what he likes; where there
is no master, everybody is master; where everyone is
master, then everyone is a slave."
The right of liberty is a natural right and it resides in
the person, because he is a person. It is his self-deter-
mination with regard to fulfilling his natural final goal
without interference. The purpose and end of man in-
dispensably require that man be free and that freedom
arises from his right to work out his destiny. That is
the heart of the matter. His importance as a person is
dominant. As a person he possesses intelligence and a
free will to fulfill his destiny. These make up the spir-
itual side of his nature- his soul. It follows then that
for the fulfillment of his destiny, man must be free and
it is the duty of the State to secure and protect that
freedom to enable the person to achieve his destiny.
Liberty is not an end but a means to an end - a return
to God. For man is not only mere flesh, blood and bone
but spirit or soul, and the soul is immortal.
Any civilization worthy of the name rests in God,
the immortal soul, liberty and conscience. The State is
constructed to secure these natural rights, man's human
liberty, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, free-
dom from regulation except that imposed by the law of
God or the law of the State grounded in the law of God.
Law, in the juridical sense, is a binding rule of con-
duct. The Natural Law binds in the moral sense. But
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such submission to the Natural Law or higher law is
enslavement according to the materialist, while its re-
jection is liberty. On the contrary it is manifest that
out of the Natural Law man is conscious of his own
right to liberty- to fulfill his end unhindered by so-
ciety or the State. Further, if he has no such natural
rights but only those prescribed by the State, then
indeed is he slave to the State or the ruling majority.,
Is there a conflict between law and freedom? Where
does the Legislature derive its power to bind the mem-
bers of the community? Liberty is positive in itself
because man must be free to work out the ends of his
existence and the right so to do must be his, anterior
to the will of the State of any group or individual. Since
he must respect the same right equally in others his
right of liberty must not be abused or unrestrained.
What then is the relationship of the State to our right
of liberty? We all believe, indeced we know, that man
is a social and political animal. He is a person, an in-
dividual, but he is a social being as well. It is natural
that we live in society, be it village, town or city. To
place man in "a state of nature" as do Hobbes and
Rousseau, in disregard of man's natural desire to live in
civil society, is to close our eyes to reason, history and
man's inclination. Man develops with his fellows in a
civil society regulated by law for the common good.
Man, always and everywhere, lives in a society. This is
an imperative of his nature. It was necessarily so, begin-
ning with the family. He is naturally fit for society
through intelligence and speech and inclination -soli-
tude is abhorrent to him. The State is a natural society.
Law is necessary to an ordered society. The end of the
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State is the common good of the people. The State
arises from the act and the consent of the people.
Someone must preside over this society, drawing its
endeavors towards the common good and this authority,
like society itself, has its source in nature and God
is its author.
To state it another way: man, as such, singly has no
right to make a regulation for another man, since both
are equal. But man's nature impels him to live in
society and as a social being to prevent as far as pos-
sible the conflict of wills among the members of society.
To accomplish this, laws and government are required.
Without law and government such society would be a
mere aggregation of persons. The very living together
in a community implies, presupposes regulations con-
trolling the actions of the members of the community
and this, of course, is Law and Government. It follows
that man is not only a social being by nature but a
political being as well. Civil Society is impossible with-
out law and government. It follows that civil authority
is natural to man. It is manifest that since God is the
Creator and since man by his nature is social and po-
litical, then civil society and civil authority are natural
institutions. The "form" of government requires the
consent of the members of the community or state - as
does the selection of those who shall administer its af-
fairs and exercise the powers of government. The
members of the community may change the form of
government. But this must be done in a lawful manner.
Man is not free to resort to anarchy, which means the
destruction of society. For since man is by nature social,
that which would destroy society is contrary to the
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Natural Law, which ordains order and obedience to
lawful civil authority.
The point we make is that civil authority derives
from God; that in a legitimate civil society man has
civil liberty which he enjoys as his very own by the
exercise of human liberty; that man enters the social
political order under the dictates of the Natural Law.
It is not by a social contract as Rousseau would have
it- which may or may not be entered into by man -
or by conventional agreement to live in civil society by
the device of having all individuals pool their rights
by assigning or alienating them to the community that
juridical society results. No one can in any lawful sense
alienate all his rights, else he would no longer be an-
swerable for his acts. Manifestly, it would not be pos-
sible for man to discharge his duties to God or his
fellow man if his rights were turned over to civil society
or the State. Civil society as such being natural to man,
his formation of political society is lasting, not revocable
at his whim. If it were otherwise, there would be no
permanency or real stability to civil society. Since no
man or group of men, without more, has control over
another man as a matter of right - consequently the
power of the State to govern the persons making up the
community must come from the Creator, Himself.
Otherwise, whence would come the power or punish-
ment for violation of law? If the individual or the
group, as such, does not have the right, how then can
it be bestowed by them on what they call the State?
For as we have seen, the State does not assemble a
multitude of men in a given place and thenceforth rule
over them. Rather is it "an organic and organizing
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unity" of people who have the right to be heard on the
duties imposed upon them by the political society which
they by consent have constructed for the common good.
Regardless of the many reasons that man has for
banding together in a community to live harmoniously
under a ruling power, it had to be based on a consent
to a lawful and social bond. If men were to have their
liberty regulated or curtailed for the common welfare,
it had to be for a moral reason - for the free acts of the
individual are moral. It is only by consent of this kind
that the power of sovereignty juridically arises.
From the early days of our republic this concept of
the State was clearly recognized. Justice Wilson in
Chisholm v. Georgia, expressed it thus:
"By a state I mean, a complete body of free per-
sons united together for their common benefit, to
enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do jus-
tice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its
affairs and its interests: It has its rules: It has its
rights: And it has its obligations. It may acquire
property distinct from that of its members: It may
be bound by contracts; and for damages arising
from the breach of those contracts. In all our con-
templations, however, concerning this feigned and
artificial person, we should never forget, that, in
truth and nature, those who think and speak, and
act, are men."
Man cannot develop, as he is impelled to do, in fam-
ily life, as such. He realizes that in civil society his
desire for the opportunity of development economically
and socially, with safety for his family and himself can
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be satisfied and that in society, he has obligations as
well as rights and these arise out of the civic bond.
Thus by consent men are bound together in a social
union which we call the State. Thus bound there is
conceded to that legal entity or juridical person all the
power necessary to accomplish the common welfare.
That which had been a multitude of people has become
a juridical body with jurisdiction to arrange a form of
government which when accomplished is juridically the
state, and the people select the governing body with
power to administer the affairs of the community for
the common good. In our student days, it was summed
up as follows:
"Civil society is necessary to human nature; civil
power is necessary to civil society; civil power is
nothing without citil obedience; civil obedience
is necessary to human nature; God commands
whatever is necessary to human nature; God com-
mands obedience to civil power; God commissions
the civil power to rule."'
Hence it follows that all public powers and authority
must proceed from God.
The enumeration in the Declaration of our rights to
life, liberty and happiness; that we are endowed by our
Creator with these rights, and that they are inalienable,
is a reiteration of a philosophy based on the Natural
Law which gave impetus to Western civilization.
At the dawn of the Christian era we have a graphic
and appalling illustration of the conflict between the
totalitarian state and the individual who asserted his
1Joseph Rickaby, s.j., Moral Philosophy, page 318.
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right of freedom. In the first three centuries historians
tell us that more than eleven million people were put
to death for refusing to forswear Christianity and wor-
ship the gods as prescribed by the emperors of Rome.
They were put to death in truly barbaric fashion be-
cause they asserted their right to worship God according
to the dictates of their own conscience.
In the passing centuries resistance on the principle
that all men are created in the image of their Maker
advanced the idea of democracy and as Western civiliza-
tion developed, the dignity and freedom of the human
person was emphasized more and more in civil govern-
ment; that by his very nature, man had the right to be
respected; that as a child of God, he has the right to
accomplish and fulfill his destiny and therefore he must
have all those things which are necessary to its fulfill-
ment. They must be his by his very nature.
It follows that the State must recognize this right to
freedom in the person and protect it and insure it to
him and this by the nature of the person which is God-
given. This is the highest duty and function of the State,
to safeguard and forever defend the person's natural
right to liberty.
The world is sick today, almost unto death, and for
the reason that during the Nineteenth Century and
earlier in many places the liberty of man has been whit-
tled away and the dignity and inviolability of the person
have been outraged. This is a result of pragmatic, ma-
terialistic, atheistic philosophy that started in Central
Europe and spread to the East. Totalitarianism is its
legitimate offspring. Do not believe that totalitarianism
is a regime - it is a doctrine, a false philosophy, a dia-
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bolical religion. The world has taken to itself the things
that are God's and in many places has deprived man of
liberty. Rulers have made the world the "city of man"
and rejected the "City of God." This is secular religion,
a worship of the State by communism, fascism and
nazism, in turn. They are all secular in essence. They
all rest on the supremacy of the State and a rejection
of the inviolability and freedom of the person. As we
have seen, man was not made for the State. The dicta-
tors have made this world their kingdom; the dignity,
right and freedom of man are liquidated; he has neither
soul nor mind; no freedom, because his behaviour is de-
terministic; and of course, no God. This philosophy
enshrines these ideas. The doctrine is terroristic and
despotic, without morality or justice; destructive of all
ideas of dignity and freedom and the inviolability of
human personality; blasphemous and atheistic; the de-
spair of that civilization which came to us from Athens,
Rome and Jerusalem - which, today, is face to face
with an appalling crisis.
We, in America, are part of that European or West-
ern civilization and we are not immune as we know too
well from the disease that is eating into the vitals of
nations in Europe and in the Far East. The basis of our
democracy is the dignity of the person and his inalien-
able right to liberty. Our government was established
for the express purpose of protecting these rights, and
our Constitution and Bill of Rights give eloquent demon-
stration of that fact. In a word, the Declaration of the
Founding Fathers and our Constitution and Bill of
Rights established a jurisprudence in this Country based
on Natural Law.
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The Magna Charta wrested from King John in Eng-
land early in the Thirteenth Century, was hailed as a
great bill of rights. Yet it bestowed nothing on the Eng-
lish people - it merely recognized their rights, chiefly
the freedom of the free men. And yet as late as the
Seventeenth Century, men were executed in England for
challenging the "divine right of kings."
The very purpose of democracy is the protection of
the personal liberty of the citizen and this is its chief
merit and it will hold its life only so long as the people
believe in the moral point of view, for the doctrine of
human liberty is a moral doctrine, a natural law doc-
trine, and freedom begins and ends with God, Himself.
Today, in our own country, many reject the philosophy
of the Founding Fathers that liberty inheres in man by
his very nature. With them a contrary philosophy pre-
vails; that law and morals are and should be entirely
separated. This view is supported by certain professors
in our law schools and by some judges in our courts.
They adopt and defend the doctrine of expediency, which
is the pragmatist view; or that of the so-called realist,
based on the theory of force or domination as the basis
for law. With this premise it follows that rights and
duties are a matter of prescription at the hands of the
State and accepted because of fear or a threat of force;
that government may control the lives of its citizens from
the cradle to the grave, and if need be, "prevent the con-
tinuance of the unfit," as a very eminent jurist once put
it.2 Nazi-Germany adopted that view and millions of
innocent persons, a minority group of men, women and
2 Shriver, Holmes Book Notices, uncollected letters and papers (1938)
181.
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children were murdered because they were not useful to
the State - to the complete horror of mankind. Euthan-
asia- a nice term to describe cold-blooded murder -
is advocated in many quarters by persons whom we have
no reason to believe are other than sincere, and defend-
ants have been put on their trial, not so long ago, for
practicing it. Not since the earliest centuries as we now
reckon time has the world been -more callous of the rights-
of fellow human beings, more cruel in its treatment of
weaker nations and minority groups than it has been in
this Twentieth Century.
Thus in modem legal thought, there are two schools,
diametrically opposite one to the other. One recognizes
moral or Natural Law as the basis of our jurisprudence.
The other has complete contempt for the moral or Nat-
ural Law concept. It is in complete accord with the ma-
terialistic and pragmatic view, that there is no such thing
as objective right or wrong; that there is no moral
"6ought" in law, only physical force; that man has no in-
alienable right, only the right given him by the State or
dominant group. Of course, it takes little reflection to
perceive that there is no such thing as a "right" if it is
bestowed by the State. If it is "given," it may be taken
away. A "right" natural to man, such as liberty, is our
very own, God-given, which we may assert and defend
against anyone, even the government itself. The bill of
rights in our Constitution does not grant these rights, but
recognizes them as ours, protects them and enjoins the
lawmaking power from infringing or violating them.
More than ever today the present problem is the choice
between these two philosophies. I reduce them to two
in the conviction that while the Natural Law doctrine is
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based in the spiritual and the moral; the other school
whether it be of the Realist, the Sociological or Positivist
order is fundamentally materialistic. Under the former,
man is free, de jure; under the latter, he is not de jure
free and independent but subject to become the prey of
force.
Among the disciples of the non-natural law group are
those who are denominated "Liberalists." The average
citizen I believe envisions a "liberal" as a generous, big-
hearted person - be he judge or philosopher or both -
who bends backward to give his fellow man the benefit
of every possible doubt. But this is not its significance in
a political or philosophical sense. Time was, centuries
ago, when "Liberalism" had a meaning from which pres-
ent day liberals have departed. "Liberalism" in the early
days was a tradition which characterized early Western
culture. The effort of liberalism then was freedom of
man and the inviolability of his personality. That was
the root of the matter and it was profoundly moral. The
Founding Fathers were true liberals. But the liberalism
of the Nineteenth Century may be delineated as the late
Thomas F. Woodlock characterized it, as "liberalism that
had lost its soul." It degenerated into a humanitarianism
unrestrained by anything, and it was a failure.
It stressed the doctrine of progress and human per-
fectibility but in an earthly and material way. Its only
objective truth was the truth of positive science. In a
humanitarian way it stressed love of neighbor but not
love of God. It was concerned about the temporal wel-
fare of men - nothing more. The rights of man were
emphasized, not to raise up the under-privileged, but to
brush aside the regulations of the State and the moral
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principles of the Natural Law. If the truth of positive
science was the basis for its thinking, it is clear that man
cannot fulfill his destiny with any aid from science; for
science tells nothing about the nature of things that most
concern us.
Walter Lippmann, in his essay "The Good Society"
(October, 1937) characterized it as the degradation of
man. He describes the liberalists as iconoclasts who
'6were too smart to be wise, too rational to be reasonable,
too much enchanted with an immature science to hold
fast to tested truths. * * * So, in the high realism of intel-
ligence there prevailed a radical disrespect for men and
the human ideals of justice, liberty, equality and frater-
nity were relegated to the limbo of old superstitions along
with God, the soul and the moral law. * * * In the fury
to explain men rationally, there was explained away their
essence, which is their manhood."
Much mischief has resulted from the doctrine of Lib-
eralism from which there is no escape, except by return
to God and the moral law and the realization that man
is created in the image of God, and that image is in his
soul.
The great tragedy of this Twentieth Century arises
from a pragmatic philosophy which is wholly at war with
Natural Law principles. Miss Barbara Ward calls this
sharply to our attention in her book, "Faith for Free-
dom" 3 pointing out that we of the democratic West in
our constant struggle for wealth and power, with scant
or no regard for human rights, the inalienable essence,
and the well-being of our neighbor, may well have en-
gulfed ourselves. That materialism has crept in and
$ Atlantic Monthly, December, 1950.
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holds forth in our democratic form of government is un-
deniable. That concept, however alien it intrinsically is
to our democratic form, can flourish within its frame-
work. Our democracy based as it is on Natural Law
principles was not intended as a form of government only,
but a way of life, idealistic and in harmony with our
nature. This idea is admirably expressed by the late
Thomas F. Woodlock in his essay on "Democracy":
"Democracy, as a 'way of life' for human society, by
its nature is best conducive to the preservation of
men's personal liberty and is therefore the most de-
sirable form of government. For its success, however,
it demands a high state of civic morality in the
people, who must be educated to a relatively high
standard of intelligence and, above all, mutual tol-
erance. In the absence of either it is almost certain
to degenerate, and in that process liberty tends to
disappear. Forms alone are not sufficient for its
preservation; they must be animated by a deep popu-
lar faith in principles of liberty itself. These prin-
ciples, arising as they do from the fact of man's
personality, are ultimately religious, for man's
personality necessarily implies God, the soul and the
moral law." 4
That such was the philosophy of the Founding Fathers
enshrining as it did the liberty of man is indisputably
clear from the words of the Farewell Address of our First
President:
"This government, the offspring of your own choice,
uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full inves-
4 Thomas F. Woodlock, Democracy: Definition and Debate.
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tigation and mature deliberation, completely free in
its principles, in the distribution of its powers, united
security with energy, and containing within itself a
provision for its own amendment, has a just claim
to your confidence and support. Respect for its au-
thority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its
measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental
maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political
system is the right of the people to make and to alter
their constitution of government. But the Constitu-
tion which at any time exists, 'till changed by an ex-
plicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sac-
redly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the
power and right of the people to establish govern-
ment, presupposes the duty of every individual to
obey the established government." 5
If we are at the crossroads and must choose between
the philosophy of materialism and Natural Law - the
choice lies between the materialistic and the spiritual
conception of life. If matter is all, then man is the help-
less slave of the State or the dominant forces. If the basis
of liberty arises from the Natural Law, then God is the
Creator of man and the universe, and man has as his
very own a human dignity and inviolability which postu-
late human freedom. This conception compels accept-
ance on its own intrinsic merits. Liberty demands and
requires the Natural Law. Without it, freedom, peace,
order and happiness are impossible.
5 Washington's Farewell Address.
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THE NATURAL LAW AND THE
RIGHT TO PROPERTY
I stand in need of liberty myself, and I wish every creature of
God may enjoy it equally with myself.-Priestley.
Men are not corrupted by the exercise of power or debased by
the habit of obedience; but by the exercise of a power which
they believe to be illegitimate, and by obedience to a rule they
consider to be usurped and oppressive.-DeTocqueville.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed, and in the next place,
oblige it to control itself.-Madison.
The principal innovation . . . instead of moral values nothing
but naturalistic values. Naturalization of morality. In the place
of sociology a doctrine of the forms of dominion.-Nietzsche.
B EFORE the final trumpet sounds and I enter the lists
to maintain here against all comers -the natural law
right to acquire and hold private property and the civil
or municipal law right not to be deprived of it except
by due process of law, let me make some plain avowals
and do some preliminary tilting.
First, I do not require anyone to admit that this right
whose devoir I do is "the best [natural right] that God
ever made or will make."'
Second, I shall be satisfied with these admissions: that
1 "It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that his
lady is a very nice girl-if you do not admit that she is the best that God
ever made or will make, you must fight." Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HAIv.
L. REv. 40 (1918).
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it is a very important natural right; that the founding
fathers and those who came after them profoundly be-
lieved that its recognition and just preservation were
prime essentials to the pursuit of happiness here; and
that, except for the European minded radicals and their
fellow travelers, witting and unwitting, the American
people as a whole still hold to and act on that belief.
Third, I am a true believer in the moral law as the
basis not only of the right to property but of all our nat-
ural rights, and am bound to concede that the right of
the positivists, pragmatists, and materialists among us to
hold to and profess a contrary belief is itself a natural
right of no mean proportions; and that so long as their
belief is honestly entertained and civilly and honestly
put forward, I can justly make nothing of it but a good
clean fight.
Fourth, I must make it clear that in plumping for the
natural law right to acquire and own private property, I
do not put it forward as an absolute and unqualifiable
municipal or civil law right. I do, though, insist that
just governments are formed not to destroy but to pro-
tect and expand this natural right as well as the others,
and I do emphatically deny the moral right of any gov-
ernment to abrogate, deal inconsistently with, or unjust-
ly abridge it. Further, I recognize that in any society,
the slightest removed from a state of nature, the ade-
quate and proper securement and enjoyment of natural
right, particularly the right to private property, requires
concreting into positive law. I, therefore, agree that a
just government operating on natural law principles
may, and should, in exchange for the security its laws
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afford the right,2 properly and justly impose upon the
exercise of it, restrictions and conditions not inconsist-
ent with basic principle.
Fifth, jealous of my reputation for at least ordinary
intelligence and firmness of character, let me, by clearly
stating why I came here, rebut the presumptions against
both arising from my presence.
When Dean Manion, singling me out as the particular
target for the scoffs and gibes, the slings and arrows of
the sophisticated positivists, the skeptical pragmatists,
the creeping socialists, the social planners 3 of all shades,
dubbed me "knight of Property," he did not soft soap
or Tom Sawyer me into whitewashing this fence of his.
He merely raised his Macedonian cry, "Come over and
help us," and, like-minded with him, touching the nat-
ural law in general and the natural rights of men, par-
ticularly as they have been recognized, protected, and
preserved in our constitutions, federal and state, I have
girded my loins, put on my armor of proof, and come
this long way to do so.
I know as well as he does that the days of the happy
and peaceful wanderings through the pleasant fields of
academic speculation about, and historical discussion of,
2 "That which in the natural state was a mere invisible thread, in the
social state becomes a cable." Jeremy Bentham, as quoted in HUTCHESON,
LAW AS LIBERATOR 181 (1937).
3 These consider government and society, and the relations of man to
man, only from the point of view of so-called economic democracy and a
planned economy. It is their view that prices and wages and a wider, in-
deed a redistribution of economic goods, is to be the chief end of govern-
ment, and all other, especially all older value judgments, are to be dis-
carded. With these, hand in hand with the diminishing emphasis on moral
and spiritual values, and on political and civil liberty, and the constitution-
al way of life here, there goes a tremendously increasing consciousness of
and emphasis on government and governors.
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natural law as the higher moral law, the universal source
of all just positive law, which has characterized the first
three sessions here, are over, and that the time has now
come to begin the fight in earnest.
4
Now that this Institute is leaving off talking about
natural law, as an academic abstraction, to get down to
cases by talking about natural rights as realities, about,
in short, words become flesh and dwelling among us,
from here on out it will have to be every man for him-
self and the devil take the hindmost, but I am not afraid.
For am I not a Scotch Irish Presbyterian, born in the
Bible Belt in original sin, but by the Grace of God a
brand snatched from the burning? Was I not nurtured
on the strong meat of the Old Testament and the shorter
catechism, and in the belief that "There is a spirit in
man and the breath of the Almighty giveth him under-
standing"? 5 Was I not moreover raised in the tough
belief that "What must be, will be," and that the chil-
dren of light may, indeed must, answer duty's call in the
sublime confidence that human fortitude will always
equal human adversity?
Besides, though in a short spell of teaching at North-
western I did once experience a temporary metempsy-
chosis with the spirit of the judge moving out, the spirit
of the teacher moving in,6 I am not a law teacher. I
am, and proud of it, a judge, one of those naive, simple-
4 In FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 100-1 (1940), the
author, of whose effective championship of natural law I make grateful
acknowledgment, carefully disclaims championship of the "doctrine of
natural [and inalienable] rights," and of the faith and works of the Found-
ers. Indeed, as to them, he comes close to taking to his verbal heels.
5 Job, 32:8.
6 Hutcheson, The Worm Turns, or a Judge Tries Teaching, 27 ILL.
L. Rzv. 355 (1932).
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minded jurists ' "who possess ideas of honor, patriotism,
and rights," and "find their strongest defense of these
ideas in terms of some irrefutable, natural world to
which the ideas correspond." I
Until now the men of little or no faith, pragmatists
and positivists, the creeping socialists, the leaping-now
men,9 have paid the project and the goings on here
little mind. Particularly has this been true of those
politically minded pragmatists 10 and postivists, who,
posing as disinterested factual observers of the passing
scene, chroniclers of the "pure fact of law" seem really
plugging for a naturalistic jurisprudence, 1 with courts
"Occasionally we do not find a jurist who resents the unfavorable
comparison of jurisprudence to natural science and who is inclined to
charge the critics of the law either with simple ignorance of legal learning
or else with some sinister purpose to undermine respect for law. Such jur-
ists believe that the meaning of the Constitution stands like the Rock of
Ages. Unscrupulous men may ignore its strict apportionment of rights and
duties; ignorant men may never reach an understanding of its beneficent
provisions. There it stands, a proper object for study and veneration, but
never an instrument to be used according to the needs of the times." Ros-
INSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 9-10 (1935).
8 Id. at 309.
9 These claim that nothing matters now but the new; that a back-
ward look is regressive and destructive; that modernism, especially the con-
ception they hold of it, is all that counts.
10 John R. Commons, in his description of Administration, thus points
this out: "On the one side it is 'the pragmatic philosophy' of present day
social sciences. . . . It is not mere coincidence that twentieth century phi-
losophies began to call themselves 'pragmatic'-not the individualistic prag-
matism of William James, but the social pragmatism of John Dewey [See
DEWEY, Looic oF INQUIRY (1938)]." Commons, Twentieth Century Eco-
nomics, 5 JOURNAL O' SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 32 (1939). "On the other side
it is the problem of collective action in control of individual action. Collec-
tive action, with its working rules, takes the place of the divine law and
natural law that descended from John Locke and the eighteenth century
philosophies." Id. at 38. Cf. Otto, The Social Philosophy o: John Dewey,
5 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 42-60 (1939).
11 See RoBINso.N, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935).
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and judges discredited and their independence de-
stroyed,12 a planned economy and government unlimited
in the saddle.
Nearly one hundred years ago Amiel wrote in his
Journal Intime: 13
Every despotism has a specially keen and hostile
instinct for what ever keeps up human dignity and
independence. It is curious to see scientific and
realist teaching used everywhere as a means of
stifling all freedom of investigation as addressed to
moral questions under a dead weight of facts. Ma-
terialism is the auxiliary doctrine of every tyranny,
whether of the one or of the masses. To crush what
is spiritual, moral, human-so to speak-in man by
specializing him; to form mere wheels of the great
social machine instead of perfect individuals; to
make society and not conscience the centre of life,
to enslave the soul to things, to de-personalize man-
this is the dominant drift of our epoch. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Scornful they undoubtedly have been of the simple
goings on here. From the lofty perch of their skeptical
sophistication, 14 the legal positivists who claim to see
2 HUTCHESON, Book Review, 3 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 58 (Nov.-Dec.
1943); HUTCHESON, NEw INSTRUMENTS OF PUBLIC POWER (unpublished
lecture to the California State Bar, 1946).
13 1 AmIEL, JOURNAL INTIME 58-9 (Ward transl. 1923).
14 ". . . the restraints which positivism at present imposes on legal
thinking, and which prevent us from following this natural method, take
the form not so much of spccific beliefs as of emotional attitudes. Today it
is still positivism which is the sophisticated view. It alone has 'brave true
things to say.' It alone has purified its truths by a thorough washing in
cynical acid." FULLER, op. cit supra note 4, at 104. Cf. ARNOLD, T~s
SYMBOLS OP GOVERNMENT (1935), and ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAP-
ITALISM (1937).
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only "the pure fact of law," existing completely inde-
pendent of, indeed, entirely apart from moral 15 ideas
and principles, have no doubt looked down their noses
at what they regard as this twaddle about natural law.'0
They have not, though, felt called upon to come in
swinging. Ostentatiously ignoring the so-called poor
bumblers who have been babbling here about natural
law, the pragmatists, 1 7 particularly the fellow traveling
Pharisees among them, have gone on making broad their
phylacteries and enlarging the borders of their garments.
Paying tithe of mint, anise and cumin, and making a
religion of cynicism, skepticism and unfaith in general,
they have omitted the weightier matters of the law,
Judgment, Mercy and Faith.
As for me, I will be found no dissembler, sailing under
false colors. Like the man called Hi, "I inform you be-
fore we embark. You may charge me with murder or
want of sense. We are all of us weak at times. But the
slightest approach to a false pretense was never among
25 "Just what are the positivists trying to do? We know, of course,
that they seek some means of drawing a sharp line between law and moral-
ity, between the law that is, on the one hand, the law that ought to be, or
is trying to be, on the other. We know also that the positivists since Hobbes
have almost without exception denied that they were drawing this line for
ethical or political reasons." FULLER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 84.
26 Cf. ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYER 269-75 (1935).
17 Said one of them in a revealing moment when, the cards all stacked
and marked to suit him, the dealer was shuffling, cutting, dealing and call-
ing the cards to bring about the revolution he and his followers were pro.
claiming: "Since the advent of the Roosevelt administration we have had
the language of pragmatism embodied in messages to the Congress and in
political speeches .... Critics of the New Deal are likely to claim that this
pragmatic way of talking is only an excuse for the adoption of fundamental-
ly unsound but politically expedient policies." ROBINSON, LAW AND THE
LAWYERS 275-5 (1935).
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my crimes." i8 I confess that I am, and proud of it, not
a New Dealer but a Jeffersonian, Lincolnian, American,
one of those "solemn men" whom the pragmatists, the
scientists, the skeptical devotees of facts, 19 so deprecate,
"who go about the world preaching that there is some-
thing more to be relied upon than facts.... "2 20 But I
am not cast down by this deprecation, for I believe on
the authority of men a little more scientific than, at least,
as learned as, these; that " . . facts are sterile until
there are minds capable of choosing between them,...
minds which under the bare fact see the soul of the
fact"; 21 that ". . . a fact is nothing except in relation
to desire ... ",; 22 and that "There is in the human in-
tellect a power of expansion, I might almost call it a
power of creation, which is brought into play by the
simple brooding upon facts." 23
I confess, too, that I am not ashamed to call myself a
patriot, a moral being who believes in honor, piety, and
the other moral virtues, a jurist who believes in constitu-
tional rights and the justice which recognizes and pro-
tects them, in short a plain and simple man who believes
in the good life and that there is more to living than
18 LEWIS CARROLL, FIT FOURTH, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK
(1891).
19 "Throughout Europe and America men are becoming increasingly
conscious of the inadequacy of prevailing social philosophy as a guide to
the practical problems of social control. Karl Marx and Jeremy Bentham
saw long ago that such control would ultimately have to rely upon the
sense of fact that dominates natural science." ROBINSON. LAW AND THE
LAWYERS 22-3 (1935).
20 Id. at 17.
21 Henri Poincare, as quoted in HUTCHESON, JUDGMENT INTUITIVE
23 (1938).
22 Will Durant, as quoted id. at 26.
23 Tyndall, as quoted id. at 25.
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mere bodily health.24 Compare and contrast with this
simple profession of faith in moral virtues this ques-
tioning: 25
But it is fair to ask how much the world has
gained by the insistence upon these moral qualities
like piety, justice, patriotism, which have an exist-
ence and glory over and above that of physical
health and a sound serene mind. . . . One some-
times wonders whether we should not be better off
one hundred or five hundred years from now if we
could set out with the simple objective of a maxi-
mum of bodily health for the population of the
world.
God forbid, I say.
Compare, too, this downright repudiation of, and un-
faith in moral values, this pattern and prototype of
modern materialism, pragmatism and naturalistic juris-
prudence so called: 26
. . . for Nietzsche believed that not only was the
Christian God dead, but also the rational moral
values, which he regarded as a secularized Chris-
tianity. He outlined his program in sharp words.
"The principal innovation . . . instead of moral
values nothing but naturalistic values. Naturaliza-
24 "Jefferson was a typical representative of the liberal and humani-
tarian nationalism of the eighteenth century. He was a patriot: 'The first
object of my heart is my own country. In that is embarked my family, my
fortune, and my own existence ... '
"His patriotism was devoid of any narrowness or exclusiveness. The
same strict moral laws which governed the conduct of individuals were
valid for the life of nations." KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 308-9
(1944).
23 RoBINso', LAW AND THE LAWYERS 17-8 (1935).
' KOHN. THE TWENTrETH CENTURY 48 (1949).
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ion of morality. In the place of sociology a doc-
trine of the forms of dominion."
But, so convinced am I that the future of civilization
and of liberties lies not with the materialists, the collec-
tivists, the pragmatists, the naturalists, the men of un-
faith, but with the natural law men, the men of faith,
that, crying, "Lord, I believe, help Thou mine unbe-
lief," 2 7 I have come here to stand up with the men
of faith and be counted as one. So standing, I affirm
and reaffirm my faith in natural law and in the natural
rights of men; faith that the state is created for the in-
dividual and not the individual for the state; faith in
human dignity and in man as a collaborator with his
God; faith in human destiny; faith that in preserving
the principle of this Government from corruption lies
the last best hope for the preservation of that dignity,
the realization of that destiny; faith, in short, that when
this Government was formed,
28
:. . Something fundamentally new and of immense
importance had happened. For the first time a na-
tion had arisen on the basis of these truths held "to
be self evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among those are Life, Lib-
erty and the Pursuit of Happiness"-truths which
the nation could not give up without destroying its
own foundation.
And now, having, by these preliminary tiltings and
laying about me, cleared the way, I come to my precise
27 Mark 9:24.
'a KonN, TmE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 291 (1944).
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part in this tourney. This is to prove on my body what
I came here to maintain, that the right to acquire and
own private property, secured and protected in and by
our constitutional form, though it is now a right by posi-
tive law, is also, and primarily, a natural right having
its origin and basis in natural law and that, as such it
may not justly be abrogated, unreasonably abridged, or
inconsistently dealt with by positive law.
In doing this, I shall not seek to define natural law,
discuss its sources, review its changeless, though chang-
ing, history and content through the ages, 29 or deal with
it in general except in the briefest kind of way. All this
has been excellently done in the Institutes and lectures
which have preceded this paper.
Neither shall I undertake to catalogue and classify
the sources and variations, the grades and shades of
positivism, to compare them with natural law theories.
This has been done with complete thoroughness, great
clarity and fine feeling by Fuller in his admirable book,
The Law in Search of Itself, on which, in the notes I
have gratefully drawn.
Finally, though the temptation to do so is great, I
shall not call the roll of the positivists and pragmatists,
beginning with forthright, honest old Thomas Hobbes,
and ending with the not so forthright and honest Adolph
Hitler and Joe Stalin, to match them man for man with
the natural law men of history, and to debit and credit
the ledger of each with his services and disservices to
human dignity and human destiny.
29 See. Chapter VI, "Law as Purpose, and the Will to Ever Juster
Laws-The Principle of Social Peace" in HUTCHESON, LAW AS LIBERATOR
(1937).
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Of the natural law in general, it is sufficient to say
that I believe with Cicero that it is the principle which
lies behind all the order in the world, the universal, the
ultimate, principle behind all positive law, the ground-
work, the firm foundation, upon which the structures of
human society rest. It is the principle of that justice,
the search for which is the bond of men in states, the
end of government, the end of civil society, that justice
which has ever been and ever will be pursued until it be
obtained or until liberty is lost in the pursuit.
Stammler, in his Theory of Justice, declares that ideal
justice, justice in the abstract, the constant, and perpet-
ual disposition to render to every man his due, is and
always has been the same, yesterday, today and forever;
that, though in its manifestations through formal law in
different countries, under different climates and condi-
tions, and at different times, it has appeared to be dif-
ferent, this is only appearance; that what has in each
instance appeared is not justice itself but merely the
result of fallible human efforts under the pressure of
natural law with a changing content to express it in
positive law. He maintains, in short, that justice in its
purest form as an aspiration is timeless and universal; 3'
that at any place, at any time, justice as an ideal is, and
always must be, the same. He concludes, and I agree,
that justice is perhaps the purest and most binding con-
cept men have ever entertained; that at no time or
place, no matter how long or dark the night has seemed,
has man been entirely free of its authority; and that
"whoever maintains and defends a specific legal rule
30 Ibid.
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with definite content as absolute, simply because it is
legal, is guilty of an objectively unjust act of will." 31
The Right to Property
the corruption of any government generally
begins with the corruption of its principle, and the
duration of any given form depends upon the per-
sistence in a given society of the particular principle
which is characteristic of that form.-Montesquieu.
It is certain that the right of property is the most
sacred of all the rights of citizenship, and even more
important, in some respects, than liberty itself....
-Rousseau.
Men cannot, surely, be said to give up their nat-
ural rights by entering into a compact for the better
securing of them.-Priestley.
Having come now by easy stages to the very nub of
my subject, the natural right to property, I shall deal
with it in the same cautious and leisurely way.
First, I will admit that in the very nature of things,.it
is impossible to conceive of municipal or civil law, law in
the concrete, without accepting so much of the positivist
philosophy as considers law to be a definite rule laid
down by the sovereign which the subject must obey. I
will admit, too, that unless and until set down in munici-
pal or civil law, the natural right to property and the
other natural rights, except as individuals or groups
have the requisite force to maintain them, have no bind-
ing force, no compulsive sanction behind them except in
"' STAMULER, Tea THEoRY or Jusncz 26 (1925).
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the moral sphere; 32 and that human nature being what
it is, for the effective enjoyment of these rights, the
compulsive force of municipal or positive law is greatly
needed.
I refuse, though, to admit their claimed corollary that
the theory of natural rights is a delusion and snare; that
the history of man's struggles for liberty in that name is
now just an old wives' tale; and that in claiming that we
believe in the existence of natural rights and in the eter-
nal verity of man's struggles to secure and preserve
them, we natural law men are ignorantly or knowingly
dealing in moonshine and roses.
With due and becoming deference and humility in
presuming to differ with the positivists, these naturalistic
jurisprudents, these "pure fact of law" men, I make bold
to say that I think the shoe is on the other foot. Indeed,
I think that in refusing to recognize, as we do, both nat-
ural and positive law rights, both morals and law, it is
the pragmatists and not we who are the self-deceived
moon gazers. It is they who are mainly responsible for
the prevailing confusion of thought which permits some
to propound as necessary and irrepressible a conflict here
between human rights and property rights.
32 In an early Texas case, Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 TEx. 37,
3 S. W. 249, 253 (1887), there is a very interesting discussion of this
point. Said the court: "A right has been well defined to be a well-founded
claim, and a well-founded claim means nothing more or less than a claim
recognized or secured by law.
"Rights which pertain to persons, other than such as are termed natural
rights, are essentially the creatures of municipal law, written or unwritten;
and it must necessarily be held that a right, in a legal sense, exists, when,
in consequence of the existence of given facts, the law declares that one
person is entitled to enforce against another a given claim, or to resist the
enforcement of a claim urged by another."
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John Austin, the patron saint of the moderate posi-
tivists, began the law's descent to the Avernus of unfaith
by proposing to distinguish morals from law. Some of
the modem but less moderate pragmatists have con-
tinued it by proposing to divorce morals from law, while
the downright radicals among them, including the fel-
low travelers, preferring headlong descent, propose, as
Nietzsche did, to abolish morals altogether.
When we natural law men speak of rights, including
the right to acquire and own property as natural and
unalienable, we speak of them as they were in man's
natural state. We do not speak of them as they are set
down and secured in the municipal law of government
organized as ours is on natural law principles and subject
to constitutional limitations, the law which is at once the
will and consent of the people. We freely recognize the
right, indeed the duty, of such a government, to affix
conditions to the exercise of natural rights consistent
with the declared aims and ends of the society. We
recognize its right, too, within constitutional limits, to
impose upon the enjoyment and exercise of it, restric-
tions not inconsistent with the basic right. But this rec-
ognition is not at all inconsistent with the belief in nat-
ural law rights, or in the bedrock premises and argu-
ments on which that belief rests. These premises are
life, liberty, and property, and the natural right to them
does not exist because men have made laws. On the con-
trary, laws exist because life, liberty, and property, and
the right to them existed before there were laws, and
because men formed themselves into social orders and
set up governments in order to make laws wherewith the
better to preserve and protect these rights.
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Further, it must be admitted by all that before any
social order was formed or any laws made, no man had
a natural, a moral, right to deprive another of his life,
his liberty, or his property. It must be admitted, too,
that in the event of attack, upon them, each individual
had a moral right derived not from positive, but from
natural law, and inherent in him as a moral being, to
defend his person, his liberty, and his property to the
full extent of his force and power.
While, therefore, any political society that men form
has the right, indeed the duty, to organize and support
by law a common force to protect constantly and en-
hance the enjoyment of those rights which its members
have by their very nature and which they formed the
society to preserve and protect, no society can justly use
that common force against an individual or a group to
deprive him or them of any of those rights for which
the society was organized to maintain.
Such a perversion of force would be equally contrary
to our premise if used by an individual or by the or-
ganized society. Force has been given to us as individ-
uals to defend our individual rights, and no one can
justly say that this force when aggregated into the com-
mon force may be used by us as members of society to
destroy or unjustly abridge or impair the equal rights of
any of our brothers.
To restate: no individual acting separately can mor-
ally or lawfully use force to infringe upon. or destroy
the natural rights of others. The common force is noth-
ing more than the organized combination of the individ-
ual forces. It logically follows, therefore, that it may
not be so used; and that if it is, individuals have the
THE NATURAL LAW AND RIGHT TO PROPERTY
natural right to resist that force to the extent, if need
be, of throwing off the government altogether and set-
ting up a new and just government in its place.
Nothing, then, can be more evident than that, in any
given society organized on just principles, positive law is
the collective organization of the natural and individual
right to the lawful defense of individual rights. Substi-
tuting common force for the individual forces, it
authorizes it to do what the individual forces have a
natural and lawful right to do. It preserves and protects
the rights of individuals in their persons, their liberties,
and their properties. It maintains the right of each
and causes justice to reign over all.
3 3
It is on this simple but completely sound conception
of natural rights, including the right to acquire and own
property, that I here take my stand. It was on this bed-
rock conception that the seventeenth and eighteenth
century philosophers, when they dreamed of human lib-
erty, of a new heaven and a new earth, raised their
political and philosophical edifices toward heaven to
make their dreams come true. It was on this bedrock
conception that the founding fathers based their claims
to natural rights and their ideas of a governmental form
which would secure and advance them. It was on the
solid basis of this conception that, with dynamic and
shattering force, the politico-legal ideas of the natural
law and the rights of man, of law as liberator, of the
dignity and greatness of the individual human soul, and
of man as a collaborator in Human Destiny with his
God, came to dominate the political thinking and action,
33 C1. BASTIAT, TIuE LAW 1-9 (1950).
62 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
indeed the life of a great part of the western world.
Our ancestors, ". . . men who possessed ideas of
honor, patriotism, and rights... ," 3 those moral quali-
ties which our fact-devoted pragmatists so scorn, staked
their fortunes and their lives on the eternal verities of
the natural or moral law, the natural or moral rights
which just governments are created to preserve and,
therefore, may not abrogate or unjustly impair.
The very nature and origin, the very genius of their
laws, had taught them, as Englishmen, that laws came
up from the people, not down from the prince. They
had taught them, too, that laws were based on the
ideals, and flowered from the customs and needs of the
people when these were strong enough to become articu-
lated into law, and that laws should change when the
times required. Laws with them were made for men,
not men for laws. Oceana, not Leviathan, was their
model. Harrington, not Hobbes, their preceptor. Lex
Was rex with them, not rex, lex.
Nurtured on the common law, the notion of the civil
law that law is the command of the prince which the
people have no part in making and yet must unquestion-
ingly obey, had never been a welcome familiar with
them, and if it had been, had they not thrown off the
prince for the people? The history of England and of
America had taught them to demand their rights and
liberties, not as new rights and liberties, but as confirm-
ing those which had, or should have been, theirs im-
memorially.
For centuries it had been the English habit of mind to
34 RoBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 309 (1935).
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go from liberty to liberty, as though these liberties had
always been theirs. The Anglo-Americans of the Revo-
lutionary period were, too, the full heirs of the complete
and final overthrow in England of authoritarianism as a
dogma, and of the triumph there of the ideals of the
natural law, of just law as supreme ruler, and of consent
and will as the fundamental basis of just law. They,
therefore, found themselves, the revolution over and the
slate clean, in a position to enter upon and fully enjoy
their inheritance.
Determined to do this not only for the time being but
for the future and having no stomach for the omni-
competence of Parliaments, they set about to constitute
their governments so that those having special and par-
tial interests, and desiring to substitute their private in-
terests for the justice of the common good, could not
unite to obtain control and pass unjust laws, that is,
laws violative of the natural law principles on which
their governments had been founded and their constitu-
tions adopted to maintain.
It was not a new idea to them that the legislative
should not, indeed could not, enact laws which ran
counter to what were then regarded as the natural rights
of man. They knew that in their last analysis all gov-
ernments rest on force and that the great end of justice
is to substitute the notion of right for that of violence
and to place a legal barrier between the power of the
government and the use of physical force.
When, therefore, our forebears, in breaking off from
England and in forming a government of their own,
wrote and spoke of the "laws of nature and of nature's
God" and of the natural rights of man, they were not
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dealing with theoretical abstractions. They were deal-
ing with the realities, with words become flesh and
dwelling among men. They knew from their reading
and from their own experience with unjust governments
and governors the nature of governments and of men.
They knew they had not bought liberty in fee simple
absolute for a price paid down in full, that they had
only made a down payment on it and that eternal
vigilance was the price they and their posterity must be
forever paying.
Knowing that it was the nature of men to learn but
to forget, to learn and forget again, they took the great
est pains in the Declaration of Independence, in the
constitutions and bills of rights, federal and state, and in
the Federalist Papers, to tell us so. In these documents
of eternal significance and verity, to those of us who as
real inheritors revere and cherish our heritage, they
wrote down at once their understanding and distrust
of the nature of governments and governors, and their
abiding faith in natural law and the natural rights of
man. Written down at a time when men really believed
that "Men who their duties know, but know their rights,
and knowing, dare maintain, .. , these constitute a state,' ' 35
they were testaments to that faith. They were written
down by men who thought in first principles, whose
minds were steeped in the notions of natural law and the
rights of man, the dominant political philosophy of their
day. Their hearts were lifted up with the vision of a
new freedom on a new earth, and they believed, with
the philosophers, in the perfectibility of man, and with
35 Sir William Jones, What Constitutes a state? quoted in HUTCHESON,
LAw AS LiBERATOR 5 (1937).
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them, that the human species was capable of an un-
bounded improvement.
Yearning toward posterity, the founders greatly de-
sired that theirs would some day reach the delectable
mountains, from whence they could see the Heavenly
City of a perfect and equal justice far shining and some
day later even pass over the sacred river to rest under
the shade of the trees.
But they were not philosophers, and they spent little
time in dreaming. Intensely practical, they believed with
Priestley-though like him they believed in a limited
government-that "government being the great instru-
ment of this progress, that form of government will have
a just claim to our approbation which favors this prog-
ress, and that must be condemned in which it is re-
tarded." 36
Many of them were lawyers; all were laW-minded.
Burke's apostrophe to the American Colonists, in his
Speech on Conciliation, 7 was known to them all. They
knew that:
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable ne-
cessity of government, and that it is equally unde-
niable that whenever and however it is instituted,
the people must cede to it some of their natural
rights in order to vest it with requisite powers.
They knew with Montesquieu that the corruption of any
form of government generally begins with the corrup-
tion of its principle, and they knew that if the spirit of
the laws-that government was made for man, not man
36 Ibid.
-1 Edmund Burke, as quoted id. at 6.
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for government-failed, then also would fail the law.
They knew that the nature and principle of each gov-
ernment had a strong influence on its laws and that if
they could but establish and maintain the government on
natural law principles, the laws would appear to flow
thence as from their source. They believed with Rous-
seau, that "It is to law alone that men owe justice and
liberty. It is this salutary organ of the will of all which
establishes in civil rights, the natural equality between
men." 8 They knew with him, too, that "Obedience to
a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty," 31 and
that "the passage from the state of nature to the civil
state produces a very remarkable change in man, by sub-
stituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving
his actions a basis they formerly lacked." 40
They particularly adopted as their own Rousseau's
doctrine that: 41
Apart from the primitive contract, the vote of the
majority always binds all the rest. This follows
from the contract itself. . . . This presupposes, in-
deed, that all the qualities of the general will still
reside in the majority; when they cease to do so,
whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer
possible. [Emphasis supplied.]
They agreed with him, too, that it would be entirely: 42
38 RousszAu, THz SOCIAL CONTRA cT AND DISCOURSES ON POLITICAL
ECONOMY 256-7 (Everyman's Library ed.).
39 As quoted in HUTCHESON LAW AS LIBERATOR 83 (1937).
40 Id. at 84.
41 Id. at 83n.
12 Id. at 101.
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. . . possible for the Council of a Democracy to pass
unjust decrees and condemn the innocent; but this
never happens unless the people is seduced by pri-
vate interests, which the credit or eloquence of some
clever persons substitutes for those of the state; in
which case the general will will be one thing, and
the result of public deliberation another. [Emphasis
supplied.]
When they drew up their written constitutions, their
written consent and will to be governed, they took the
greatest pains to provide against this happening by lim-
iting governmental powers and by marking out freedom
areas, areas of individual conduct and action, into which
state power could not enter to forbid or to command.
It was accepted as axiomatic with them that "all men
desire in this world a happy life," 4' and that a happy
life meant one in which by diligence, enterprise, and
opportunity, each could advance his fortunes and secure
the feelings of independence and of security which own-
ership sufficient for his present needs, with some provi-
sion for his future, always gives to man. Nobody then
denied that the right to acquire and own property was
a natural right which governments must preserve and
protect; no one could be found who believed differently,
and if any had been found, he would have been dis-
missed as a fool or a knave.
They knew that life and liberty alone could not give
happiness; that a man would be no better than a slave
if he could not exercise his natural right to acquire and
own property and to retain it free from arbitrary con-
trol; and that a government which did not recognize
43 Id. at 179.
68 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
and preserve this right could not be just. Locke, by
whom they were greatly influenced, had put it this
44way:
The great and chief end, therefore, of men unit-
ing into commonwealths and putting themselves un-
der government, is the preservation of their prop-
erty; to which, in the state of nature, there are
many things wanting.
For the legislative acts against the trust reposed
in them when they endeavor to invade the property
of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part
of the community, master or arbitrary disposer of
the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.
The reason why men enter into society is the
preservation of their property; and the end while
[why] they choose and authorize a legislative is
that there may be laws made, and rules set, as
guards and fences to the properties of all the so-
ciety, to limit the power and moderate the domin-
ion of every part and member of the society.
Thirdly, the supreme power cannot take from
any man any part of his property without his own
consent for the preservation of property is the end
of government, and that for which men enter into
society.
Rousseau, strong contender though he was for the
authority of society and the sovereignty of the general
will, as long as, but only while, the general will remains
just-that is, acts in accordance with the principles of
natural law-proponent and advocate though he was of
the view that a society organized on natural law prin-
4f Ibid.
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ciples should, in accordance with those principles, have
full and adequate power over its members, including
their lives and their property, is yet one of the strongest
advocates of natural rights, 45 including particularly the
right of the individual man to acquire and own property.
He declared, as vigorously as Locke did, that the protec-
tion of private property is the end of government. In
his Discourse on Political Economy, he said: 46
It would be still worse . . if their lives, liberties,
and properties lay at the mercy of persons in power
without-it being possible for them to get relief
from the laws.
It is certain that the right of property is the most
sacred of all the rights of citizenship, and even more
important, in some respects, than liberty itself,...
or finally, because property is the true foundation
of civil society, and the real guarantee of the under-
takings of citizens....
45 "He [Rousseau] was concerned with establishing government on a
basis compatible with the freedom of man and with his dignity as a ra-
tional being. Natural man and natural order were for him not historical
facts, belonging to a dim past, but eternal norms which alone were able to
guide the peoples wishing to replace the shaky and arbitrary foundations of
government by force with the permanent and lasting ones of a rational so-
ciety of free men. Thus alone the paradox could be overcome that man
was born free, and everywhere was in chains. Since force does not create
right nor establish a legitimate power, and since society must exist and man
can live only within it, a way must be found for him to will society out of
his own free will, and obey laws because he has prescribed them for him-
self.
"In this new contractual society in which the people are sovereign, in-
alienable individual rights are not abolished, but made secure in a state
based not on arbitrariness and force but on the moral law." KoHN, Tix
IDEA op NATrONALISM 240-1 (1944).
"Rousseau's importance for and influence on the development of mod-
em political thought could hardly be exaggerated .... " Id. at 237.
461 Rousseau, op. cit. supra note 38 at 271.
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Montesquieu declared it to be the duty of the laws to
see that rights in property given by the civil law should
be invariably preserved; that it would never be to the
public good to deprive an individual of his property.
Bentham, the utilitarian, the active apostle of the great-
est happiness principle, the moderate positivist, was a
firm and active believer in the general beneficence of
laws which secure men in the possession of their prop-
erty. He maintained that the great virtue of law was
"to give men that strong and permanent expectation
that they could hold what was theirs." 47 Said he: 48
But perhaps it may be alleged that the laws of
property are good for those who have property and
oppressive to those who have none. The poor man,
perhaps, is more miserable than he would be with-
out laws.
Not so. The laws in creating property have cre-
ated riches only in relation to poverty. Poverty is
not the work of laws; it is the primitive condition of
the human race.
Conclusion
A word or two about the confusion of thought which
makes some propound as irrepressible and irreconcilable
here a conflict between natural rights and social rights,
between property rights and human rights, or, as some
put it, between democracy and property,49 and I am
done.
There is, there always will be, until perfect justice
41 As quoted in Hutcheson, LAW As LIBERATOR 181 (1937).
4S Ibid.
4.1 See id. at 175 et seq.
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comes, a conflict between the justice and the injustice
of opposing claims upon and to property asserted by gov-
ernment acting for and through the majorities which
have the power and by private owners acting for them-
selves. There certainly is a complete, an irreconcilable,
opposition between state socialism 5 0 of any kind and the
natural right to acquire and own property, the same
complete and irreconcilable opposition that there is be-
tween those forms of government and the form which
we enjoy.
There certainly is not, there cannot be, if terms are
properly defined and used, any conflict, any antagonism
between property and the limited constitutional govern-
ment we enjoy, any between human rights and rights in
property, as we know them here. All rights are and
must be human. A fundamental tenet of a liberal, lim-
ited constitutional democracy-the only kind we know-
is the right of free men to a reasonable approximation
to equality, not of ability, but of opportunity to acquire,
to own, and to hold property, and not to be deprived of
it except by due process of law. There is not, there can-
not be, therefore, any opposition between property and
the limited constitutional democracy we have, or be-
50 "Call it what you will, Fascism, Naziism, Communism, every totali-
tarian movement has meant and still means the destruction of a govern-
ment of checks and balances, even of the possibility of the evolution of
such a government. It has meant the establishment of government by de-
cree, by bureaucratic planning, by concentrated and irresponsible power.
It has meant the regimentation of peoples by means of the expropriation
not only of natural resources but also of employing capital, and the even-
tual taking over of the ownership of the total wealth of the nation by a
class of professional politicians. In the end, it has meant the loss of free-
dom, in any sense that Americans u iderstand the word-not only free
enterprise but also free speech, free elections, free press, and every other
freedom as well. Sproul, in an address, May 31, 1948.
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tween the ownership of property and the principle of
democracy.
The theory of such a democracy requires the mutual
recognition that the individual has no rights in his prop-
erty which are in conflict with the justice of the general
will, that justice which is seated in natural law and pre-
scribed in the constitution; and that the government has
no rights and the individual no duties and obligations in
respect of his property except in aid of and measured by
that justice. In a society like ours, the discovery, in a
controversy between them, whether the claim of the in-
dividual or that of the government is in accord with
that justice, completely and at once determines the issue.
Discussions then in terms of conflicts between property
and democracy, between human rights and property
rights are foolish and misleading. They should be re-
stated as conflicts between the owners of private property
and the government over the extent and the manner of
the exercise in a particilar case of public control over it.
This latter conflict is by no means inevitable. It arises
only where unjust claims are put forward on either side.
In October, 1820, when this country had stood and
withstood for thirty years, Thomas Jefferson, with that
pride and devotion to his country and its institutions
which marked him as the foremost apostle of American-
ism, wrote to Richard Rush: I"
We exist and are quoted as standing proofs that a
government so modeled as to rest continuously on
the will of the whole society, is a practicable goy-
51 As quoted in 3 RANDALL, LIFE oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 458 (1858).
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ernment. Were we to break to pieces, it would
damp the hopes and efforts of the good, and give
triumph to those of the bad through the whole en-
slaved world. As members therefore, of the uni-
versal society of mankind, and standing high in re-
sponsible relation with them, it is our sacred duty
to suppress passion among ourselves, and not to
blast the confidence we have inspired of proof that
a government of reason is better than one of force.
In bringing to a close this appeal for the preservation
from corruption of the natural law principles on which
this government was formed, may I not commend these
views to all men of good will who believe in our country
and its institutions and, believing, work and pray earnest-
ly without ceasing that its principle be preserved from
corruption. May I not too in that spirit and in all hu-
mility, in these dark and troubled times, urge upon us all,
natural law men and positivists alike, in Jefferson's
phrase "suppressing passion among ourselves" to strive
earnestly and in good faith, to understand, to minimize,
and, if possible, to reconcile our points of difference, and
to magnify and, if possible, enlarge our points of agree-
ment. If we can do this, we will not "blast the confi-
dence we have inspired of proof that a government of
reason is better than a government of force." 52 On the
contrary, we will justify and increase it.
52 Ibid.
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THE NATURAL LAW .AND THE RIGHT
TO SELF-EXPRESSION
T HIS is the fourth Convocation of the Natural Law
Institute at the great University of Notre Dame. In
these four annual sessions some 20 papers have been
presented, examining the background and various of
the manifold aspects of Natural Law. The availability
of these essays in permanent form is an enduring testi-
monial to the spiritual insight, and the deep patriotism,
of those who have sponsored this much needed under-
taking.
And it is of course appropriate that the connection
between the two- between religious and patriotic con-
viction- has been frequently emphasized at this Insti-
tute. It could scarcely be otherwise at an American
gathering devoted to examination of the Natural Law.
In spite of erosion and decay it still remains true, as
de Tocqueville noted of our people in 1831, that "Re-
ligion... must be regarded as the first of their political
institutions." That is the rock on which the Republic
stands.
Although this Institute is now so well established, I
think it is true that, prior to this morning, no direct
consideration had been given to my subject: "The Nat-
ural Law and the Right of Self-Expression." I confess
to having, for a time, thought this omission somewhat
surprising.
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If we agree that man receives certain rights direct
from God, it would certainly seem that the right of self-
expression is basic among them. Man is a social being,
distinguished physiologically from the lower animals
not merely by his thumb but more especially by the
relative facility with which he can communicate his
thoughts to his fellows. All this communication, esthetic
or utilitarian, spiritual or carnal, uplifting or degrading,
is a form of self-expression.
Are we not forced to assume, then, that the ability to
communicate, with tongue, or pen, or brush, or chisel,
is of itself evidence of the divine in man, since his power
of communication so clearly distinguishes him from the
beasts of the field? If so, any examination of the Nat-
ural Law, which is God's Law, should logically begin
with an affirmation of Freedom of Expression. For,
without that freedom, none of the other aspects of Nat-
ural Law could be given a general emphasis, and it
could be called illegal even to preach the word of God.
A right is something that can be exercised. If a Right
cannot be exercised, it becomes unsubstantial to the
point of non-existence.
That argument is certainly plausible. And if it were
the whole truth, instead of only a part thereof, you
would doubtless have considered the Right to Freedom
of Expression at your first Institute, disposing of the
subject for better or worse. But Dean Manion wisely
decided otherwise. He knows, I am sure, that we have
here a disturbing issue, surrounded by booby traps,
which it is my difficult assignment to uncover, or at
least locate.
In this endeavor I came to realize why all the emi-
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nent theologians and jurists who have spoken at this
Institute have heretofore dodged the subject. There is,
however, one classical type of person who rushes in
where angels fear to tread. Obviously it was one of
those around whose outstretched neck Dean Manion
would eventually throw his noose. He is surrounded by
angels. What he needed this morning was a- com-
mentator.
He needed a commentator not so much because the
breed is commonly supposed to be fluent in expression
-a college president could have filled that bill. But
those who write professionally for the papers, or talk
over the radio, necessarily learn something of the haz-
ards of unrestricted self-expression. I do not refer
merely to the law of libel. Let me recall an incident
that will help to illustrate.
In 1938, the evening of October 29 of that year to be
exact, a precocious young man named Orson Welles
staged a radio skit describing an invasion of this country
by superhuman creatures from the planet of Mars. It
was, of course, a free-hand dramatization of the fantasy
called The War of the Worlds, by H. G. Wells - no
relation of Orson and indeed written years before the
latter was born -in fact written so long ago that I
enjoyed it as a boy.
Technically, this radio skit was extremely well done.
It started with a program of dance music, supposedly
emanating from a New York hotel. Soon this was
broken by bulletins, telling of strange disturbances -
explosions of incandescent gas - on the planet Mars.
More dance music and then more bulletins about Mars,
until a culminating report told of the landing of huge
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metal cylinders in New Jersey, of the eruption of weird
creatures from these interplanetary vessels, of their
attack with heat rays and other withering devices. Four
times, during the broadcast, the unseen audience was
told by an announcer that it was all fictitious. That did
not dull the effect. Let me quote a few lines from the
description of the public reaction, as told by Frederick
Lewis Allen in Only Yesterday.
"Terror-stricken people rushed out of their houses
and milled about in the streets, not quite sure
whether they were being attacked by Martians or
by Germans, but sure that destruction was on the
way.... In Newark, New Jersey, several families,
convinced that a 'gas-attack' had begun, put wet
cloths on their faces and tried to pack all their be-
longings in a car; the traffic was jammed for blocks
around. A woman in Pittsburgh prepared to take
poison, crying, 'I'd rather die this way!' A woman
in Indianapolis rushed into a church screaming,
'New York destroyed; it's the end of the world..."
That last observation contains a domplete non-
sequitur. It thereby emphasizes that the. emotional con-
tent is often stronger than the logical among us humans.
Right here we begin to see the scope of our problem,
for the Natural Law assumes not merely that the uni-
verse is rational, but also that man is a rational creature
in a rational creation.
No radio station in this country would today fake
an atomic bomb attack. But, before drawing conclu-
sions from one example of unrestricted freedom of ex-
presion I would like to mention another, not in the
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field of entertainment but at the opposite poll of intel-
lectual argument.
A century ago a disagreeable but unquestionably bril-
liant German scholar was spending his days in arduous
research at the British Museum. The stated aim of Karl
Marx was to appeal to the intelligence of mankind and
certainly Das Kapital demands extraordinary mental
concentration, even if one finally concludes that it is all
pretentious rigmarole. Moreover, this undeniably in-
fluential book is characterized throughout by a pervad-
ing arrogance, and a complete absence of spiritual con-
sideration of any kind. To Marx, in the words of a
recent English critic: "Das Kapital was primarily a
means to impose his superiority." That book therefore
stands as a monument to unbalanced, intellectual self-
expression. Today our country is engaged in a gigantic
defensive effort against an evil that can be directly
traced to the uninhibited distortions promulgated by
this embittered German Jew.
Here are two very different illustrations - and every-
one of us could supply others for himself - of the fact
that self-expression, no matter how theoretically desir-
able from the individual viewpoint, can and does inflict
injury on Society as a whole. That injury can be per-
manent, as well as transient. It may affect morons, or
infect teachers in our colleges. Yet self-expression is
certainly closely connected with that "Right" of Liberty,
which our Declaration of Independence declares to be
"unalienable," because it is a part of the endowment
which men have received from their Creator -a part
of Natural Law. The First Amendment to the Consti-
tution confirms the freedom of speech and press implied
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in this organic law as first adopted. Does this mean
that we should uphold a freedom when it is used to
attack this Constitution as a "bourgeois monstrosity,"
fit only for destruction? That is a most appropriate
problem for the consideration of this Institute.
A clue, but only a clue, to the solution of this problem
is found in the homely saying that "Liberty is not Li-
cense," affirmed in a previous paper on this program.
But that is not to my mind a very satisfying apoph-
thegm, since literally Liberty is License, and nothing else
but License. The word "license" comes to us from the
Latin licentia, meaning "freedom to act." What is
Liberty, if it is not freedom to act? What is the Right
of Self-Expression, if it is not freedom to act in the
field of the communication of ideas, spoken or repre-
sented?
So our clue brings us immediately to the mystifying
fact that, in the course of centuries, the word licentia
has had a wholly paradoxical development. On the one
hand, it still means that which is permitted. If you
have difficulties with a traffic cop it certainly helps to
have a driving license. On the other hand, license also
means something that should not be permitted. I sup-
pose that any student at Notre Dame would be seriously
embarrassed, to say the least, if his superiors could justly
call him licentious. Thus- perverse though it may
seem- nobody has license to be licentious.
Here is a literal confusion-a "pouring together"-
of opposite meanings in a single noun. And as verbal
detectives, confronted by this etymological confusion,
we may reasonably guess that some other element was
formerly involved in licentia. When that other element
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is still present, license is permissible; if it is absent,
license is not permissible. It will require a historical
detour to identify that elusive ingredient. Possibly we
would be better off if the modem American mind were
as well designed to get around roadblocks as is the mod-
em American car.
We may note that in ancient Rome only part of the
population was entitled to licentia - or freedom to act.
Slaves had no such freedom; nor did teenagers, and
even in the case of women it was severely limited. The
Roman matron was wholly subject to the decisions of
the head of the family. Though the nominal head of a
family myself, I do not claim that this was a desirable
arrangement. I merely note that in the Golden Age of
Rome it was the actual fact.
Licentia, in the Roman practice, was reserved for
those who had virtus -the quality of free manhood.
And there was still another restriction on license. A
Roman had to possess pietas - a sense of duty - in
order to have licentia. Pietas, however, was really a part
of virtus to the Romans. If you wete virtuous you were
also pious and you could not be virtuous unless you
were pious.
We live in an age in which many abstract words,
along with the qualities for which they stand, have lost
much of their pristine value. Today if one says that a
man is virtuous and pious there is an implication that
he is somewhat effeminate and namby-pamby. Women
are illogically supposed to be more virtuous than men,
though actually only more raulierish, if you will note
the extra syllables. Indeed we are curiously prone to
regard the virtuous as lacking virile qualities. The vir-
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tuous are "good," we would agree, but not real "he-
men."
To the early Romans it was exactly the opposite.
Those whose conduct was brave and whose sense of
responsibility was strong were therefore virtuous and
pious, and you did not merit the adjectives unless you
were manly as we use that word. Moreover, and this I
emphasize, you had no license unless you were both
pious and virtuous.
I am a charter member of the S.P.C.A.W. - the So-
ciety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Abstract Words.
But I shall not apologize for this idiosyncracy in an
assembly containing so many budding lawyers who
already realize that most of our spade work in legal
discrimination and codification was done by the Ro-
mans. We must understand the thought behind Latin
abstractions in order to understand the fundamentals of
our legal system. We must ask ourselves, as Cicero did,
the searching question that really divides the naturalists
and positivists. Is law a matter of human discovery,
or of human invention?
In their magnificent effort to discover law the Ro-
mans early came up against the problem of reconciling
the innate individual sense of what is fair and reason-
able, with the social necessity of generalized and there-
fore arbitrary rules of conduct. This dilemma was at
least partially resolved by the doctrine of equity, mean-
ing that in some respects all men - and women too for
that matter - were deserving of equal treatment by the
magistrate, regardless of whether the individuals af-
fected were Roman or barbarian, patrician or plebeian,
free man or slave. Thus, well before the coming of
THE RIGHT TO SELF-EXPRESSION
Christ, it was generally accepted by the Romans that
there is a universal natural law (ius naturale) back of
the common law of peoples (ius gentium) and back of
the law for Roman citizens (ius civile). That under-
lying natural law justified the doctrine of equity and
was used to support the right of individual self-expres-
sion for every man, even if it were not specified in ius
gentium; even if it were denied by ius civile.
The principle of equity, however, cuts two ways. On
the one hand it emphasizes extenuating circumstances
for the humble and underprivileged transgressor. On
the other hand it demands even-handed justice for the
powerful but irresponsible individual who considers that
he is not subject to natural law. The purpose of equity,
in Virgil's immortal words, is: "Parcere subjectis et de-
bellare superbos,"-- to spare the lowly and strike down
the proud. Without the principle of equity we might
never have seen the necessity of separating the judiciary
from the executive, thereby placing those with political
power under the control of law. But that is an aside.
What is very much to the immediate point is the
balance that practical Roman experience brought into
legal consideration. It was not by accident, nor as a
result of any fine-spun theory, that license was given
only to the virtuous and pious man. Slowly, and with a
great deal of trial and error, it was discovered that no
Right can be established without the acceptance of a
conjoint Responsibility. Of course the Greeks, as Pro-
fessor Maurice LeBel emphasized here two years ago,
had seen the necessity of this synthesis and proclaimed
it. But it was the Roman achievement to systematize
the establishment of natural rights by tying them with
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parallel responsibiliies. The Romans, before the birth
of Christ, had made the concept of natural rights prac-
tical by associating it with the doctrine of self-restraint.
Only he who could restrain himself had license for self-
expression. And that idea of self-restraint is the missing
ingredient which, by its frequent absence, gives an
equivocal meaning to the word license as we use it
today.
The coming of Christianity was of course of the
greatest possible import for the doctrine of natural
rights in general, and the right of self-expression in
particular. Christ emphasized the universality of these
rights, to an extent that seemed revolutionary to the
most liberal contemporary Romans. But He emphasized
even more the parallel responsibilities of the individual.
Every circumstance in the life of Christ tells us, indeed,
that the acceptance of stem discipline is the condition
for eventual reward. "Whosoever doth not bear his
cross, and come after me, cannot be my disciple."
It seems to me - and I hasten to add that I am only
an amateur historian - that the rigorous Christian reli-
gion took root quickly in the Roman Empire, in part
because great minds had prepared the soil in advance.
Cicero, for instance, had argued that any statute con-
travening the natural law need not be obeyed and in-
deed is not properly called law. In his own words, no
more so than the regulations of a band of robbers. The
commands and prohibitions of the natural law are laid
upon all men, said this great Roman lawyer, through
the medium of their conscience, the organ that "knows
with" God. The role of statute law is really to supple-
ment that which is ordained by God, supporting those
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who wish to obey the supreme command, restraining
those whose ears are deaf to divine promptings. "The
discipline of law," wrote Cicero, "is drawn from the
inmost nature of man." Those who recognize this dis-
cipline are for that reason- and for that reason alone
-entitled or licensed to express themselves freely.
Cicero was murdered some forty years before the
birth of Christ, shortly after lamenting in a famous
letter that: "We have completely lost the Republic," an
assertion all too well justified by subsequent Roman
history. But political and social demoralization under
the Caesars served to strengthen individual belief in
natural law, as set forth in the teachings of Christ. The
corruption of earthly government and the venality of
man-made law did not undermine but fortified faith in
the natural law, and in many ways this tremendous
drama is being re-enacted in the hearts and minds of
men today. Yet it was no easy doctrine that the twelve
apostles went forth to preach. It was not, and is not
now, easy for men to practice restraint and self-control.
So there was no pretense that those who took up the
cross of Christianity would find it a light burden, or
that the Church would provide vacations, social security
and old-age retirement pensions for all its adherents.
"He that endureth to the end shall be saved." That
doesn't sound like a "Fair Deal" election slogan.
I have been laboring to point out that even in the
West, distinguished from the East largely by a more
closely reasoned faith in Natural Law, that concept has
always been regarded as conitingent rather than abso-
lute. Natural Law certainly exists independent of the
minds of men, but you must personally discover its
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meaning before you may personally claim its benefits.
It follows that the Right of Self-Expression, derived
from Natural Law, is only a contingent Right. Self-
Expression may be freely exercised by those who have
developed self-discipline. It is not granted uncondi-
tionally to anybody; decidedly not to those who assume
that they can get Rights more cheaply from the Presi-
dent than from God.
In earlier days it was generally recognized that effort
is the prerequisite for reward. When the ability to read
and write was a distinction, acquired over serious ob-
stacles by those who really valued learning, the sacrifice
involved was itself a price paid for freedom of expres-
sion. But the child of today, taken by bus from home
to school, coddled through the three R's by ingenious
methods of instruction, with schooling from kinder-
garten to post-graduate level paid, in many cases, out
of taxation, has himself made far less effort than used
to be necessary to learn the art of self-expression. And
this is true not merely of oratorical or literary skills. It
applies to all the more definitely artistic forms of self-
expression. I know nothing about the early training of
Pygmalion, but the fact that he was so sour on women
indicates that he had a tough apprenticeship. Mozart
and Beethoven certainly toiled ceaselessly to develop
their genius. And Michelangelo did not learn his
anatomy in any public works of art project.
Let me make my point clear. I am in no way criti-
cizing educational techniques which have made learning
so much easier and more attractive than it used to be.
I believe in free public education and I can think of
many worse ways of wasting the taxpayer's money than
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Federal grants in behalf of even third-rate artists. I do
draw the line at television ads asserting that childhood's
tender bloom is wilted by parents who fail to see the
educational value of Kukla, Fran and Ollie. But short
of such simon-pure baloney I would go a long way in
smoothing the path of any serious student.
Nevertheless, it remains eternally true that before
anyone seeks license to express himself he should have
acquired, somewhere, somehow, some part of that virtue
and piety which the Romans of Cicero's day associated
with licentia. Individual freedom of expression, in
short, implies an honest individual effort, and beyond
that certain generalized standards, to insure that the
expression shall not be socially deleterious.
The necessity for such standards has long been recog-
nized in most of those fields of self-expression that we
call professional. The man or woman with an urge to
express himself in medicine or the law must first "qual-
ify" by passing examinations that require arduous and
protracted training. It is not enough to have an interest
in the subject, nor even to have worked at it spasm6d-
ically, as I happen to have done in the case of the law.
Dean Manion is kind enough to think- or at least he
thought until this morning - that I have a certain com-
petence to address this Institute. That friendly judg-
ment, however, does not entitle me to defend or prose-
cute the most trifling case in any court in thIs country.
I am not qualified to do so.
In other professions, such as teaching, architecture,
engineering and banking, the standards are less for-
malized, but not less real. They are very real in the
vital field of religious self-expression. I am not ac-
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quainted with the details of the sifting process which I
know is rigorously applied to applicants for the priest-
hood, but I feel sure that it seldom errs on the side of
laxity. My own religious affiliation - that of the So-
ciety of Friends - is unusual among other respects
in that it has no professional priesthood. Here it would
ill become me either to defend or criticize this custom.
It is appropriate to point out that the practice is in no.
way at variance with the doctrine of Natural Law.
Quakers do not subscribe to ecclesiastical distinctions,
because of their profound conviction that all men are
on an equal footing before God. And this is really the
strongest possible affirmation of the belief that Natural
Law operates upon and is binding on Everyman. The
absence of a professional ministry does not mean, as
sometimes thought, that any worshipper in Quaker
Meeting is equally entitled to rise and deliver a homily
to his associates. Before such indulgence the true Friend
must have felt himself "moved by the Spirit," and it is
further assumed that he will have personally subscribed
to the Discipline of his Yearly Meeting, or governing
body, and will have answered conscientiously the Que-
ries of his local Meeting.These are searching questions:
"Do you endeavor to express in your daily lives the love
and brotherhood, the sincerity and simplicity, that Jesus
Christ lived and taught?" Only if you can answer that,
and similar questions affirmatively, do you possess ac-
knowledged Right to express yourself in Meeting..
And the Society of Friends, I venture to assert, has
been influential beyond its numbers because every con-
vinced Friend must accept Responsibilities before-not
after - he lays claim to Rights. Precisely because this
THE RIGHT TO SELF-EXPRESSION
conscientious attitude has been so well attested, our
Civil Law is today generous to members of the Society
of Friends. Their affirmation is the equivalent of an
oath and those who claim conscientious objection to
conscription are customarily allowed to perform alter-
native service.
The same general rule, it seems to me, must apply to
our Society as a whole. The Rights of citizenship are
contingent upon, and follow, acceptance of the Respon-
sibilities of citizenship. And this acceptance cannot be
merely perfunctory, if one expects to assert the contin-
gent Right. The sense of responsibility must be positive.
It must have been demonstrated, to general satisfaction,
before the Right can properly be asserted.
When the sense of Responsibility is not affirmatively
present, in any form of individual self-expression, it
must be negatively imposed. This denial of license is
clearly a function of the State-a part of the police
power that none but anarchists would deny to the
State. For it is sadly true that almost everybody is oc-
casionally deaf to the commands of Natural Law, and
that some are permanently hard of hearing when the
still, small voice of Conscience tries to speak.
Therefore, as Cicero pointed out two thousand years
ago, the Civil Law is set up to restrain, and assist, those
who do not heed the commands of Natural Law on
their own initiative. The effort of all legal philosophy,
however, has been to make the Civil Law conform with
the Moral Law, as understood by the religious sense of
the historical period. Statutes as such must necessarily
be concerned with actions rather than intentions, but
under the doctrine of Equity every Court will take in-
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tentions into account. They pave the road to Heaven
as well as that which descends to Hell. Justice, we now
agree, demands a jury of laymen as well as a judge and
attorneys who know the law professionally. Reflect on
whether we would have had the jury system unless
those who evolved it had believed in Natural Law.
Nevertheless, the rule of the State, as law giver, re-
mains essentially repressive. It can say what people must
not do. It cannot with equal facility say what they
should do. The affirmative function, in making man re-
ceptive to the promptings of his higher nature, belongs
to the Church, whether it be separated from or linked
with political government.
That point scarcely needs laboring. But what many
people do not seem to realize is that the so-called Wel-
fare State is today trying to assume functions that are
not properly political. The effort to legislate morality
may be due to a failure of the Church, to a lust for
power on the part of those who direct the State, to the
emphasis of the capitalist system on material values, or
even to less obvious causes. In any case the trend points
towards disaster, simply because virtue and piety are
necessarily personal qualities. They cannot be impressed
from without. They must be expressed from within. The
Church is competent to help the individual in this re-
spect. The State is not. And the expansion of State ma-
chinery in the moral field serves only to emphasize its
soulless nature, leading further and further from the
Confessional, closer and closer to the Concentration
Camp.
It is customary nowadays to assert that the complex-
ity of modem civilization has forced mankind to sur-
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render the direction of his destiny to the State. If so,
we are trying to kill the Hydra by cutting off its heads,
for certainly State intervention creates at least two
problems in place of one that is solved. The ghastly
picture in the Far East is a case in point. When our
dealings with China were primarily those of individuals,
and largely directed by missionaries, the Chinese ad-
mired and respected us. Disaster came when our Gov-
ernment began to throw its weight around, on the basis
of a bipartisan foreign policy interpreted to mean that
nobody should criticize governmental blunders until too
late.
Not the complexity of our civilization, but the failure
of men to heed the Natural Law, is at the bottom of the
moral crisis in which we find ourselves. And clearly it is
not a crisis that can be resolved by piling up more stat-
ute law, or by demanding "world government" when
men are forgetting how to govern themselves. President
Truman-a badly confused leader-recently condemned
the Eightieth Congress as "do nothing." To him it
failed because it would not enact even more socialistic
legislation. A wiser President would have realized that a
Congress that does little, thus encouraging the people to
do more for themselves, is thereby fulfilling the highest
American ideals, of individual liberty and collective
freedom.
The widespread indifference to Moral Law, the
growing emphasis on Statute Law, can only lead-and
is leading-to encroachment on freedom of expression
of every kind, and perhaps especially on freedom of
speech and press. Of course, even in our fortunate coun-
try, there have always been some restraints on the Right
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to verbal and written self-expression. There is not mere-
ly the law of libel, but also blanket provisions against
disturbing the peace or inciting to riot, not to mention
explicit Constitutional provisions against treasonable
utterances in wartime. It is noteworthy, however, that
all these restraints are as applicable to the President, or
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as they are to
the humblest citizen. They are not limitations imposed
on the governed by their governors. They are limita-
tions applied equitably by impartial law to all who
clearly reveal an inability to govern themselves. The
distinction is important and we should always bear it in
mind.
Freedom of expression, even of a corrupting charac-
ter, is more jealously guarded with us than is, for in-
stance, the freedom to advertise falsely, or to sell impure
food and deleterious drugs. That is not because we
value our property, and our physical health, more than
our spiritual welfare. We cling to the doctrine of
caveat emptor - the buyer should beware - especially
in the field of opinion because it is so difficult to be sure
that any opinion is wholly meretricious. If it contains
even a portion of truth, the suppression of a distasteful
opinion may destroy that which could be helpful to
mankind. Christians, so often persecuted for their views,
should be the first to recognize this reasoning, superbly
argued by John Stuart Mill in the Essay on Liberty.
But the logic of the Essay on Liberty, and indeed the
whole case for freedom of expression, depends on the
fundamental assumption that virtus et pietas - virtue
and piety - are normal human attributes. Even with
that assumption, safeguards must be placed around the
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license of self-expression. If virtue and piety are empty
words; if there is no God behind them to give these
abstractions substance, then the safeguards of legal con-
trols must be strengthened until finally all but the opin-
ion of officialdom is verboten. Without authority there
can be no social life. There is the Authority of God and
there is the Authority of the State. At bottom there
are no other alternatives. And the more the Authority
of God is minimized, the more the Authority of the
State must be augmented. It is as simple as that.
For a long time now we have been steadily contract-
ing the sphere that belongs to God, and steadily ex-
panding that which belongs to Caesar. The theory of
the Welfare State moves, like the shadow of an eclipse,
across the face of God. And as the divine warmth is
cut off - by our own folly - we become not more se-
cure but only more baffled, anxious and confused. I
cannot myself believe that this eclipse will be perma-
nent. There is too much of goodwill, which is of course
God's will, still present in the hearts of men. But do
the American people as a whole, today, possess as much
faith in God as they have in the Atomic or the Hydro-
gen Bomb?
Recently a Washington newspaper published a survey
indicating that 40 per cent of the population of the
National Capital have no church affiliation of any kind.
Now I do not equate religious faith with church attend-
ance, nor could I do so without exposing myself to
awkward questions from those who note my own ob-
servances. Nevertheless, a failure to belong to any con-
gregation does certainly suggest an unwillingness to
honor God. And it is startling, to put it mildly, to learn
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that two out of every five people in Washington, most
of whom work for a government founded on religious
faith, are without any perceptible manifestations of such
faith. Perhaps the Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties would be well advised to inquire into the religious
inactivity of those who run the sprawling mechanism
of government. There is such a thing as passive, as well
as active, subversion.
This is really a matter of profound political concern.
A person who is without conviction, or interest, in God
is also without conviction or interest in God's law,
which is the natural law. And while one may continue
to observe a law about which one has no personal con-
cern - out of a lingering sense of morality or a fear
of punishment - that pallid observance will be wholly
lacking in any sense of personal responsibility. Yet that
ingredient of personal responsibility has always been a
necessary part of the license - the freedom to act -
permitted by Natural Law.
If you want a good football team - though perhaps
I shouldn't say this at Notre Dame this year - you must
give it close attention. If you want to preserve your
savings these days, you had better give your investments
careful thought. If you want your business to run some
place other than downhill, it too must be given continu-
ous supervision. If you want a foreign policy less waste-
ful of American lives and resources than the one we
have, it would be wise to re-examine it, thoroughly.
And if you want to preserve the Liberty that is the gift
of God, it is only rational to give rather serious con-
sideration to God himself. It isn't enough to use His
name to re-enforce an expletive.
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As the Communists know very well, the denial of
God is necessary for the triumph of their system. Lenin
said: "We do not believe in God" and therefore we
"repudiate all morality that is taken outside of human
class concepts." But the Communist attack on religion
as "the opiate of the people" is far older than the Rus-
sian Bolsheviks. In the famous Communist Manifesto,
written by Marx and Engels in London in January,
1848, you will find it asserted that "Law, morality, reli-
gion are so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which
lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests."
Law - morality -- religion. It was not by accident
that Marx coupled them together. They are joined
together, and they will stand or fall as one. Destroy
religion and you destroy morality - not immediately,
but as a room grows cold when the embers die. Destroy
morality and you destroy law, in so far as it is an effort
to support morality with an enforceable code that as-
sumes the equality of men and the individual right of
man to pursue his happiness. As morality may linger
after the decay of religious observance, so courts of law
will continue, and indeed multiply, after morality is
gone. But they will no longer dispense justice. The
spirit of the law will be dead. And the business of the
courts, as in Russia today, will be the enforcement of
the dictates of those in power.
If that evolution - and it is certainly threatened -
comes to pass there will be no more Right of Self-
Expression. Why should there be, if the concept of
Natural Law, which alone supports that Right, is dead?
Destroy the idea of God and you destroy all the abstrac-
tions that emanate from that central idea. Liberty is
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destroyed, and Justice, Mercy, Charity, Forgiveness,
Kindness- everything in life that is not directly func-
tional or for which, in the dreary words of John Dewey,
"no confirmatory experiential meaning or test can be
found." The Central Committee of the Russian Com-
munist Party only carried this positivist thought to its
logical conclusion when it ruled, three years ago, that:
"Soviet writers, artists and cultural workers can
have no other interest save the interests of the
people and the State. That is why all advocacy of
art . . . without politics, of art for art's sake, is
alien to Soviet literature . . . and must not find a
place in our books and periodicals."
Since the Communists, when they come to power,
deny the Right of Self-Expression to all non-Com-
munists, should we, under Liberal doctrine, deprive them
of this Right to which, as men, they have a qualified
claim? Logically, such tolerance would seem to be mis-
placed. No Communist believes in freedom of expres-
sion. They are quite open about it and their entire
political and social theory is indeed based on the eradi-
cation of this freedom. It is appealed to, by American
Communists, only to give them opportunity to under-
mine the system they abhor. They admit as much. So
every local government in this country is thoroughly
justified in demanding that no teacher affiliated with the
Communist Party should be employed. No school
which is supported by taxes can properly hire a teacher
who is hostile to the fundamental principles of the gov-
emnment that these taxes support. But there is more to
it than that. The man who denies the Natural Law can
THE RIGHT TO SELF-EXPRESSION
scarcely claim the privileges that spring from Natural
Law, and from that source alone.
Nevertheless, free speech and a free press are guaran-
teed by the Constitution. And even if that were not the
case we should be very careful about denying Com-
munists the right of self-expression, as distinct from po-
sition under, and benefits from, the government.
There is an obvious argument for permitting the
Communists to talk, and to continue the publication of
the Daily Worker and their other papers. By self-ex-
pression they tend to give themselves away, as has
proved true even of some of the clever ones who have
infiltrated the Government service. That is better than
driving the entire Communist movement underground.
But this is a superficial argument, and does not touch
the deeper issues.
Of far more importance is the fact that every statute
which encroaches on the Right of Self-Epression is
thereby an encroachment on the Natural Law. There
is no doubt that such encroachment may be necessary.
It may even serve to bolster, prop and support the Nat-
ural Law. But, as a general rule, the greater the po-
litical regulation, the less the spiritual development; the
more men are regimented by the State, the less they
will discipline themselves; the more we depend on
statutes, the less consideration we give to Natural Law.
The State has concentration camps for lost sheep.
But the way of the Good Shepherd was different. The
scribes murmured, saying "This Man receiveth sinners
and eateth with them." To those who knew only the
written law that was objectionable. It was not, we
know, objectionable to the angels.
The best way to protect the Right of Self-Expression
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is not to crack down on the tiny minority - the one per
cent perhaps - of actual subversives. As we have seen,
there are many of them who can and will repent. To
deny them Rights is the negative approach to the prob-
lem, even when the denial is justifiable. We cannot
encroach upon the nataral rights of any of our fellow-
men without at least threatening encroachment upon
those rights for ourselves.
The positive approach lies, I conclude, in a keener
realization of our ideals among the 99 per cent who
have not realized their need of repentance. The indif-
ferent, the apathetic and the agnostic constitute a more
real threat to America than those who openly attack
its institutions. It is the absence of faith in our own
creed, rather than the presence of emissaries of the
Kremlin, that is the danger.
Those who fail to affirm God thereby fail to affirm
the Natural Law that God alone sustains. We have for-
gotten that to divorce ourselves from moral Responsi-
bility is simultaneously to eliminate our claim to moral
Rights. No Constitutional guarantees will serve to save
the Freedom of Expression, for all Americans, unless
we also demonstrate belief in God.
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THE NATURAL LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO PURSUE HAPPINESS
T HERE is no exception to the proposition that happi-
ness is what everyone desires and seeks. "To desire
happiness," says St. Thomas, "is nothing else than to
desire that the will be satisfied, and this every man
desires." I Happiness indeed "is an act in discharge of
the function proper to man, as man. There is a function
proper to the eye, to the ear, to the various organs of
the human body; there must be a function proper to
man as such." 2 And so the desire for happiness is not
something accidental or acquired by experience. It is as
natural as the desire for food or the desire for social
communication through speech. It is part of man's
original endowment, and is fundamental to his nature.
The pursuit of happiness, therefore, whether conscious
and explicit or not, is the universal occupation and pre-
occupation of mankind.
From time immemorial there have been countless
theories as to the nature of happiness - the ultimate
good of man. St. Augustine, with the help of Marcus
Varro's book De Philosophia was able to compile two
hundred and eighty-eight opinions of the philosophers
as to the nature of happiness. None of the two hundred
and eighty-eight satisfied Augustine. It is not likely,
1 ST. THOMAS, Summa Theologica, I. 11, quaest. 5, art. 8. And cf.,
ST. THOMAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 1.
2
RICKABY, Moral Philosophy 7 (3d ed. 1892).
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then, that in the present article any theory of happiness
will be discovered which has been unheard of before.
This field has been well ploughed and thoroughly cul-
tivated throughout the ages, while the concept remains
as enigmatic as it is familiar.
Nor is it my purpose to discover new theories or pro-
pose novel considerations. I merely intend to explain
somewhat, (to the extent possible in a brief paper) the
concept "pursuit of happiness" as it occurs in the Amer-
ican Declaration of Independence. To do this it is first
necessary to view briefly some of the principal theories
of happiness that the great philosophers of the past
have bequeathed to us, so that we can place the philoso-
phy of the Declaration in its proper setting.
I.
Theories of Happiness
Early in Greek thought the concept of happiness
became identified with "the good" of man. Plato, re-
fining the theories of Socrates, taught that the good or
"well-doing" (eupraxia) depended on such harmony
between the various faculties of man that a proper sub-
ordination of lower to higher, of non-rational to rational
elements was preserved. To the earlier Greeks happi-
ness was the reward of goodness of life. To Plato it was
rather the flowering of that harmonious functioning.
Happiness belonged to the whole man and not to any
particular faculty of man, when his being was function-
ing as it should by "following nature." Happiness was
not a passive state, therefore, but consisted in harmoni-
ous activity.
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But when various schools of philosophy came to define
in the concrete what "following nature" meant, the
Epicureans took one path and the Stoics another. To
the Epicureans, following nature meant satisfying the
senses with pleasure, for the desires of the senses were
the voices of nature. To the Stoics, following nature
meant satisfying reason, which bids man to suppress, as
they thought, all his sensuous appetites. Thus while
verbally in agreement with Plato's principle of follow-
ing nature, these two schools arrived at exactly opposite
opinions as to what constituted in the concrete the good
of man, and consequently his happiness.
Aristotle agreed with Plato that nature means human
nature as a whole, which is both sensuous and rational.
Hence the good of man must satisfy both sensuous and
rational appetites. But the highest good of man is hap-
piness, because that is what all men always and unre-
lentingly seek. Therefore this happiness or highest good
must be the real purpose of a man's life.
But in what does this happiness consist? This is an-
swered by a penetrating analysis by a leading scholar:
Not in mere passive enjoyment, for this is open
to the brute, but in action, (energeia) of the kind
that is proper to man in contrast with other
animals. This is intellectual action. Not all kinds
of intellectual action, however, result in happiness,
but only virtuous action, that is, action which
springs from virtue and is according to its laws;
for this alone is appropriate to the nature of man.
3Maher, Happiness in 7 CATH. ENCYC. 131-2 (1913).
106 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
The highest happiness corresponds to the highest
virtue; it is the best activity of the highest faculty.
Though happiness does not consist in pleasure, it
does not exclude pleasure. On the contrary, the
highest form of pleasure is the outcome of virtuous
action. But for such happiness to be complete it
should be continued during a life of average length
in at least moderately comfortable circumstances,
and enriched by intercourse with friends ....
Virtues are either ethical or dianoetic (intellec-
tual). The latter pertain either to the practical or
to the speculative reason. This last is the highest
faculty of all; hence the highest virtue is a habit of
the speculative reason. Consequently for Aristotle
the highest happiness is to be found not in the
ethical virtues of the active life, but in the contem-
plative or philosophic life of speculation in which
the dianoetic virtues of understanding, science, and
wisdom are exercised.
Theoria, or pure speculation, is the highest activ-
ity of man, and that by which he is most like unto
the gods; for in this, too, the happiness of the gods
consists. It is in a sense a Divine life. Only the few,
however, can attain to it; the great majority must
be content with the inferior happiness of the
active life.
Happiness (eudaimonia), therefore, with Aris-
totle, is not identical with pleasure (hedone), or
even with the sum of pleasures. It has been de-
scribed as the kind of well-being that consists in
well-doing; and supreme happiness is thus the
well-doing of the best faculty. Pleasure is a con-
comitant or efflorescence of such an activity. [Para-
graphs supplied.]
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Therefore, the following seems to be a correct defini-
tion of Aristotle's idea of happiness: "Happiness is a
bringing of the soul to act according to the habit of the
best and most perfect virtue, that is, the virtue of the
speculative intellect, borne out by easy surroundings,
and enduring to length of days." 
4
I think the modem reader is apt to be somewhat re-
pelled by the cold and metaphysical approach to happi-
ness that characterizes Aristotelian thought. He does
mention length of days, reasonable comfort and the
society of friends. But one wonders to what extent his
choice of pure speculation as the happiest human activ-
ity was due to his occupational prejudice as a philoso-
pher. One also wonders whether he was really happy
while he speculated on happiness. Along with his fore-
runners in Greek thought, Aristotle's happiness was a
happiness of this life and of this world. Nor does he
identify the object that can satisfy the infinite capacity
of that speculative faculty.
It is not surprising then that when Christian thinkers
turned their minds to the philosophy of happiness they
expanded the theories of Plato and Aristotle by invok-
ing their belief in a future life to be spent in the eternal
enjoyment of the one Infinite God who can satisfy man's
utmost yearnings. Of these thinkers St. Augustine more
than any other influenced the course of future Christian
thought. He propounded his views first in a brief
dialogue, De Beata Vita (On the Happy Life), written
at the time of his conversion, later in his tremendous
treatise De Civitate Dei (On the City of God), and
4 RICKABY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12.
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finally in his renowned Confessions. His approach to
the subject is more psychological than metaphysical,
and though he writes of the City of God his mind is,
paradoxically, down to earth.
After disposing of the two hundred and eighty-eight
above-mentioned opinions he comes to the point imme-
diately: 5
If, then, we be asked what the city of God has-
to say upon these points, and, in the first place,
what its opinion regarding the supreme good and
evil is, it will reply that life eternal is the supreme
good, death eternal the supreme evil, and that to
obtain the one and escape the other we must live
rightly. .. . As for those who have supposed that
the sovereign good and evil are to be found in this
life, and have placed it either in the soul or the
body, or in both, or, to speak more explicitly,
either in pleasure or in virtue, or in both,... - all
these have, with a marvelous shallowness, sought to
find their blessedness [happiness] in this life and in
themselves. [Emphasis supplied.]
To those who seek their happiness in evil pleasures he
says: "You are seeking the happy life in the region of
death; it is not there. How can there be happy life,
where there is not even life?" 6 In this life happiness
consists in hope: "As, therefore, we are saved, so we are
made happy by hope." " When Augustine insists that
B ST. AUGUSTINE, Do Civilate Doi 19.4.1, as translated in 2 DoDs,
The City of God 301-2 (1871).
6 ST. AUousTINE, Confessionum, 4.12 (Wangnereck ed. 1930). [Trans-
lated by the author.]
?ST. AUGUSTINE, Do Civitate Doi 19.4.5, as translated in 2 Dons,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 307.
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true happiness is in the knowledge of the One Truth and
in the enjoyment of it, he is reminiscent of Aristotle's
activity of the speculative reason. ". . . this [is] the
happy life: to recognize piously and completely the One
through whom you are led into the truth, the manner in
which you enjoy the truth, and the bond that connects
you with the supreme measure." 8 "Happiness is
nothing else but joy in the truth .... The truth is so
loved that whoever love something else want what they
love to be the truth. . . . He therefore will be happy
. who rejoices in the only truth, the truth itself
through which all things are true." 9 "How therefore
do I seek Thee, 0 God? Because when I seek Thee,
my God, I am seeking the happy life." 10 All of Augus-
tine's psychology, philosophy and theology of happiness
is summed up in the famous phrase from the first page
of his Confessions: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and
our heart is restless until it rests in Thee." 11
About one hundred years after the death of St. Augus-
tine, Boethius wrote his famous The Consolation of
Philosophy. This work, written in prison, had exceed-
ingly great influence on medieval and subsequent Chris-
tian thought. Its author was a Christian scholar well
versed in the works of Plato and Aristotle and ac-
quainted, too, with the thought of Augustine. Boethius
had occupied important public offices but fell into dis-
favor, lost his wealth, was imprisoned, and finally exe-
8 ST. AuousTiNE, Do Beata Vita 4.35, as translated in ScHoPp, The
Happy Life 13 (1939).
OST. Auousrxw, op. cit. supra note 6,10.23. [Translated by the
author.]
'OId., 10.20. [Translated by the author.]
"lId., 1.1. (Translated by the author.1
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cuted. He was well able to testify from sad experience
to the truth of Augustine's dictum: ". . . lettered leisure,
or public business, or the alternation of these, do not
necessarily constitute happiness." 12 Although some
have cast doubt on his sanctity and even on his Chris-
tianity, Boethius was honored in the middle ages as a
martyr and even today is revered in Pavia under the
title St. Severinus Boethius, Martyr.
His discourse on happiness is in the style of a classical
dialogue between himself and the lady Philosophy who
comes to console him in prison. His thought reflects the
ancient philosophers and neo-Platonists, and to a lesser
extent Christian teachings. When Philosophy instructs
him that the aim of all men, without exception, whether
they know it or not, is the Good, Happiness, God, and
that the righteous attain this their aim and end, while
the wicked fail to reach it, we see the influence of
Augustine as well as of Plato.13 For Boethius "true
happiness... is not to be found among any of the per-
ishable things men so eagerly pursue." 14 He says: I
The forms of good are the same thing as happi-
ness, and happiness is the Highest Good which is
God....
Perfect good [happiness] exists when all the
kinds of good . . . are gathered together into a
12 ST. AUOUSTINE, De Civitate Dei 19.2.1, as translated in 2 DoD,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 297.
2S BARRETT, BOETHIUS, Some Aspects of His Times and Work 94
(1940).
14 Id., at 90.
15 BOETHIUS, De Consolatione Philosophiae, 3.34, as translated in
SnOMzLD, King Alfred's Version of the Consolations of Boethius 98,
101 (1900).
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single kind of good; then there will be no form of
good lacking; all the forms of good will form a
unity and this unity shall be eternal.
Among other celebrated definitions of Boethius (an-
other example being his definition of eternity), which
were commonplaces of medieval scholasticism, is his
definition of happiness: Beatitudo est status omnium
bonorum aggregatione perfectus (Happiness is a state
perfected by the accumulation of all good). Boethius'
teaching is especially apropos in a paper on natural law
and happiness, because his Consolation is a conscious
attempt to determine what happiness is in the light of
reason, unaided by the data of revelation.
There is no doubt whatever that when the Scholastics
of the classical age, culminating in St. Thomas, adopted
and adapted the ethical system of Aristotle their thought
was mightily influenced by Augustine's City of God and
Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy. But since the doc-
trine of St. Thomas on happiness remains essentially
unchanged today in the teaching of scholasticism and in
the teaching of the Catholic Church, I will pass it by
temporarily, in order to discuss briefly a few of those
philosophers who wrote after the time of Descartes, and
who were outside the scholastic tradition.
John Locke's teaching is especially important because
his works were in the hands of the founding fathers,
and his political philosophy was very influential in shap-
ing American revolutionary thought. He discusses hap-
piness and the pursuit of happiness, however, when
dealing with free will rathe:- than in a political context.
According to Locke, also, happiness is that "which we
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all aim at in all our actions." 16 Desire is the well-
spring of all human action. And he declares: 17
If it be . . . asked, what it is moves desire? I
answer, happiness, and that alone. Happiness and
misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost
bounds whereof we know not.... But of some de-
gree of both we have very lively impressions . . .
which for shortness' sake I shall comprehend under
the names of pleasure and pain, there being pleas-
ure and pain of the mind as well as of the body
• . . or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind;
though some have their rise in the mind from
thought, others in the body from certain modifica-
tions of motion.
Happiness, then, in its full extent, is the utmost
pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost
pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called
happiness is so much ease from all pain, and so
much present pleasure, as without which any one
cannot be content.
He then goes on to explain how the good is that which
causes happiness, and the evil that which causes pain,
and yet not every good moves man's desire, because not
every good, however great, is apprehended as a neces-
sary part of his happiness. "Happiness, under this view,
every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes
any part of it.. .. " 18
Locke's theory of happiness was closely connected
1eLocxz, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 2.21.36, in 2
Philosophical Works 380 (St. John ed. 1901).
1t d., 2.21.41-2, 2 Philosophical Works at 384.
'Old., 2.21.43, 2 Philosophical Works at 385.
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with his idea of a morality based upon the will of God.
The ultimate criterion of God's will, and consequently
of moral good, is "public happiness" in its highest de-
gree, for God has "... by an inseparable connexion
joined virtue and public happiness together . 19
Hence, says Fowler of Locke, "we have only to ascer-
tain, by the use of the natural reason, what on the whole
conduces most to the public welfare, in order to know
the Divine Will." 20 This ethical theory, then, is a
theistic form of utilitarianism based on a theological
regard for the will of God. Its influence on subsequent
writers has not always been sufficiently recognized.2 x
We shall later see that it appears in the thinking of
some of the founding fathers.
Among the writers influenced by Locke was William
Paley, Archdeacon of Carlisle (1743-1805) who was a
contemporary of the revolutionary statesman and who
published his Principles of Moral and Political Philos-
ophy in 1785.22 That work contains a much-quoted
chapter on happiness wherein the learned divine
strangely enough restricts himself almost entirely to a
shrewd consideration of the meaning of happiness in this
life, though he admits in passing that "A man who is in
19 Id., 1.3.6, 2 Philosophical Works at 160.
20 FowT-Ei, JOHN LOCKE 153 (1880). These are not Fowler's own
sentiments; he is paraphrasing Locke.
21 Ibid. "This form of Utilitarianism, resting on a theological basis,
and enforced by theological sanctions, is precisely that which afterwards
became so popular and excited so much attention, when adopted in the
well-known work of Paley. . . . I shall not here criticize Locke's theory
to far as it is common to other utilitarian systems of ethics, but shall
simply content myself with pointing out that its influence on subsequent
writers has seldom, if ever, been :iufficiently recognized."
22 PALEY, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy in 1 Tan
WORKS OF WILLIAM PALEY (Wayland ed. 1937).
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earnest in his endeavours after the happiness of a future
state, has, in this respect, an advantage over all the
world: for he has constantly before his eyes an object
of supreme importance .... "23 His theory of human
happiness on earth is reduced to this: happiness con-
sists in a preponderance of pleasure over pain. 4
The word happy is a relative term....
In strictness, any condition may be denominated
happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleas-
ure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of happi-
ness depends upon the quantity of this excess . . .
I hold that pleasures differ in nothing, but in
continuance and intensity: from a just computation
of which, confirmed by what we observe of the
apparent cheerfulness, tranquillity, and content-
ment of men of different tastes, tempers, stations,
and pursuits, every question concerning human
happiness must receive its decision.
Despite these pronouncements, Paley's further exposition
shows that he is not a pure hedonist, but rather a the-
istic utilitarian. For he makes the conduciveness of
human acts to temporal happiness, the criterion of their
morality; but he recognizes that it is the will of God
which has ordained that those acts which in the long
run make mankind happy are also morally good.
It is not my purpose here to trace the further devel-
opment of the concept of happiness in English and Con-
tinental philosophers. The theories range from the al-
truistic stoicism of German rationalists who followed
23 Id., 1.6.23.
24 Id., 1.6.14-5.
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in the footsteps of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) to the
hedonism and "hedonistic calculus" of Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1833), the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873), and the evolutionary system of Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903). Their common denominator, if
any, lies in the divorce of philosophy from theology, and
a consequent preoccupation with the psychological con-
stituents of happiness in this life, whether it be the
happiness of the individual or the "greatest happiness
of the greatest number."
The philosophy of happiness with the most ancient
lineage is the philosophia perennis of scholasticism. The
teaching of St. Thomas, derived from Aristotle and
Plato through Augustine and the Fathers of the Church,
remains essentially unchanged today in the teaching of
the neo-scholastics and of the Catholic Church. The
following is a brief summary of that teaching: 25
Man is complex in his nature and activities, sen-
tient and rational, cognitive and appetitive. There
is for him a well-being of the whole and a well-
being of the parts; a relatively brief existence here,
an everlasting life hereafter. Beatitudo, perfect
happiness, complete well-being, is to be attained
not in this life, but in the next. Primarily, it con-
sists in the activity of man's highest cognitive fac-
ulty, the intellect, in the contemplation of God-
the infinitely Beautiful. But this immediately re-
sults in the supreme delight of the will in the con-
scious possession of the Summum Bonum, God, the
infinitely good. This blissful activity of the highest
spiritual faculties, as the Catholic Faith teaches,
25Maher, supra note 3, at 133.
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will redound in some manner transcending our
present experience to the felicity of the lower pow-
ers. For man, as man, will enjoy that perfect beati-
tude. Further, an integral part of that happiness
will be the consciousness that it is absolutely secure
and everlasting, an existence perfect iq the tranquil
and assured possession of all good- Status om-
nium bonorum aggregatione perfectus, as Boethius
defines it. This state involves self-realization of the
highest order and perfection of the human being
in the highest degree. It combines whatever ele-
ments of truth are contained in the Hedonist and
Rationalist theories. It recognizes the possibility of
a relative and incomplete happiness in this life, and
its value; but it insists on the importance of self-
restraint, detachment, and control of the particular
faculties and appetencies for the attainment of this
limited happiness and, still more, in order to secure
that eternal well-being be not sacrificed for the
sake of some transitory enjoyment.
II.
Philosophical Origins of "The Pursuit of Happiness"
The never-dying words of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence cannot be quoted too often, and for our pur-
pose it is necessary to quote some of them again:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.-That to secure these rights, Govern-
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ments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed,-
That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such prin-
ciples and organizing its powers in such form, as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety
and Happiness. [Emphasis supplied.]
When Jefferson sat down to write this declaration he
did not have to consult books to find his principles.
They were part of his thinking as they were part of
the political and philosophical thinking of the times.
He tells us himself: "I know only that I turned to
neither book nor pamphlet while writing it." 26 And
again he tells us that his purpose was: 27
. . . not to find out new principles, or new argu-
ments, never before thought of, not merely to say
things that had never been said before; but. to
place before mankind the common sense of the
subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command
their assent. . . . Neither aiming at originality of
principles or sentiments, nor yet copied from any
particular and previous writing, it was intended to
be an expression of the American mind.... All its
authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments
of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in
letters, printed essays, or the elementary books of
public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.
26As quoted in BEcxER, The Declaration of Independence 25 (1922).
27 Ibid.
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It has been sometimes the fashion to belittle the fun-
damental philosophical principles of the founding
fathers, and to consider this "common sense of the sub-
ject" to be in the nature of a series of glittering generali-
ties, with little or no definite content. But the natural
law, like philosophy, "always buries its undertakers." 28
Previous convocations of this Institute as well as the
other papers contributed to the present sessions are.
ample evidence that natural law, which is that portion
of the eternal law of God made known to man by the
light of natural reason, is not yet dead nor ever will be.
I consider the natural law philosophy which was in the
very air breathed in England and America in the
eighteenth century to be substantially the natural law
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and that which
scholasticism continues to teach today.2 9 Our task at
present, however, is to examine the phrase "pursuit of
happiness" and determine what its meaning and origin
are in the Declaration.
In enumerating fundamental natural rights, many
followers of Locke, including Samuel Adams, had been
content with the classical enumeration "life, liberty and
property." Some modern writers with a predilection
for so-called human rights over property rights, and
28GILSON, The Unity of Philosophical Experience 306 (1937).
201 am not speaking here of French naturalism or of Rousseau's
natural man. The substantial agreement to which I refer includes the
following points: an infinite personal Creator, the source of man's inalien-
able rights and of moral obligation; principles of law and justice which
transcend all human positive laws, and which have their basis in God;
human nature as the measure in some sense of the immutable principles
of morality.
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with a prejudice, perhaps, against private ownership,
have thought to see in Jefferson's substitution of "pur-
suit of happiness" for "property" a great innovation.
V. L. Parrington writes: 30
. . . in Jefferson's hands the English doctrine was
given a revolutionary shift. The substitution of'pursuit of happiness' for 'property' marks a com-
plete break with the Whiggish doctrine of property
rights that Locke had bequeathed to the English
middle class, and the substitution of a broader
sociological conception....
But is it not very unlikely that Jefferson would disagree
with the Constitution of Virginia which at the very time
of the Declaration of Independence was being drafted
by George Mason with the assistance of James Madi-
son? That document enumerates as inherent natural
rights "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety." 31 Nor is there any
reason at all for believing that Jefferson did not consider
the right of acquiring property as one of the funda-
mental and unalienable rights for which governments
existed to protect. It is much more likely that Jefferson
chose the more general term "pursuit of happiness"
simply because it was more general and inclusive, and
because it echoed an ethical and political view of hap-
30PARRINGTON, Main Currents in American Thought, as quoted in
Bow), The Declaration of Independence 3-4 (1945).
alVA. CONST. § (1776). This language has been retained in all subse-
quent Constitutions, and is now found in VA. CONST. Art. I, § 1.
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piness current in the philosophy of the times.32 For
there is no doubt that the right to pursue happiness
includes the right to acquire property as well as the
right to life and liberty; and there can be no doubt,
either, that among the then current theories both of
ethics and of political science was the idea that hap-
piness is a criterion of morality, and general happiness
the ultimate criterion of good government.
The eighteenth century was a period during which
nature and power of natural reason were glorified. In
England -and consequently in America- although
S2 Cf. HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI: A Liberal Tradition in
American Constitutionalism 123-4 (1937). "Burlamaqui as one source for
the phrase, 'pursuit of happiness,' and its underlying philosophy rests
upon a number of factors. Jefferson owned a copy of Natural and Politic
Law. It is conceded that George Wythe, with whom Jefferson studied
law, was familiar with the work. In all probability Dr. Small, one of
Jefferson's mentors, was acquainted with it. In reading and copying
Wilson's pamphlet he imbibed freely the doctrine of Burlamaqui. More-
over, the concept was a rather common one in the thought of the period.
The similarity of the concept with that of Burlamaqui is unmistakable.
This has been noted by Fisher in his study of this period. Professor Cor-
win declares a striking likeness. However, he is of the opinion that the
immediate source of the phrase was Blackstone. If this should have been
the case, it came originally from Burlamaqui. In the early portion of the
Commentaries Blackstone copied liberally from Natural and Politic Law.
Sir Henry Maine has charged that Blackstone copied 'textually' from
Burlamaqui. Again, granting that Jefferson took the idea from Wilson's
Considerations, it must be remembered that Wilson copied and cited
Burlamaqui as an authority for the concept. Upon the evidence at hand
it is submitted that the original of the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' is
Natural and Politic Law." See also id., at 96, 112, 120 for apposite
citations from Burlamaqui. Cf. also Bovri, op. cit. supra note 30, at 5
n.10, where it is stated that the phrase "pursuit of happiness" occurs
three times in John Locke, though not in a political context. Boyd also
cites CHIN A1, Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of Americanism (1939),
and GANTER, Jefferson's "Pursuit of Happiness" and Some Forgotten Men,
16 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY (2d) 442, 558 (1936). See also
DUMBAULD, The Declaration of Independence and What It Means Today
60 et seq. (1950).
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the prevailing tone was religious, and God's revelations
in Scripture were still accepted with profound respect,
many thinkers (among them Jefferson, I believe)
seemed to have lost that: 33
... sense of intimate intercourse and familiar con-
versation with God which religious men of the six-
teenth and seventeenth century enjoyed. Since the
later seventeenth century, God had been withdraw-
ing from immediate contact with men, and had
become, in proportion as he receded into the dim
distance, no more than the Final Cause, or Great
Contriver, or Prime Mover of the universe; and as
such was conceived as exerting his power and re-
vealing his will indirectly through his creation
rather than directly by miraculous manifestation or
through inspired books. In the eighteenth century
as never before, 'Nature' had stepped in between
man and God; so that there was no longer any way
to know God's will except by discovering the 'laws'
of Nature, which would doubtless be the laws of
'nature's god' as Jefferson said.
This view of Becker has a considerable element of truth
in it, for the eighteenth century was the stronghold
of deism.
But it does not seem accurate to point to John Locke,
as Becker does, as authority for the unqualified propo-
sition that "men, barely by the use of their natural
faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have." m
For, especially where moral truths are concerned, Locke
33 BECKER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 36.7.
4fId. at 57.
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explicitly points out the shortcomings of natural
reason.3
Natural religion, in its full extent, was nowhere
that I know taken care of by the force of natural
reason. It should seem, by the little that has hither-
to been done in it, that it is too hard a task for
unassisted reason to establish morality in all its
parts, upon its true foundation, with a clear and
convincing light. And it is at least a surer and
shorter way to the apprehensions of the vulgar and
mass of mankind, that one manifestly sent from
God, and coming with visible authority from Him,
should, as a king and law-maker, tell them their
duties and require their obedience, than leave it to
the long and sometimes intricate deductions of rea-
son to be made out of them. Such trains of reason-
ing the greater part of mankind have neither leisure
to weigh, nor, for want of education and use, skill
to judge of. . . You may as soon hope to have all
the day-labourers and tradesmen, the spinsters and
dairy-maids, perfect mathematicians, as to have
them perfect in ethics this way. Hearing plain
commands is the sure and only course to bring
them to obedience and practice. The greater part
cannot learn, and therefore they must believe.
Fowler continues, with excerpts from Locke: 36
It is true that reason quickly apprehends and
approves of these truths, when once delivered, but
"native and original truth is not so easily wrought
out of the mine as we, who have it delivered al-
ready dug and fashioned into our hands, are apt to
" Locke, as quoted by FOWLER, op. cit. supra note 20, at 158.
86 Id. at 159.
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imagine;" moreover, "experience shows that the
knowledge of morality by mere natural light (how
agreeable soever it be to it) makes but slow prog-
ress and little advance in the world."
But by the time of the American revolution the seed
sown by Locke and his followers had ripened. In addi-
tion men had come to have a greater and greater reli-
ance on their ability through mere natural reason to
discover the moral laws of nature and the will of God.
Consequently, there is considerable truth in the asser-
tion that: 37
In the eighteenth century . . . these truths were
widely accepted as self-evident: that a valid moral-
ity would be a "natural morality," a valid religion
would be a "natural religion," a valid law of poli-
tics would be a "natural law." This was only an-
other way of saying that morality, religion, and
politics ought to conform to God's will as revealed
in the essential nature of man. ...
Thus the eighteenth century, having apparently
ventured so far afield, is nevertheless to be found
within hailing distance of the thirteenth; for its
conception of natural law in the world of human
relations was essentially identical, as Thomas
Aquinas' conception had been, with right reason.
It would be an oversimplification to imagine that the
natural law philosophy of the fathers of the revolution
represented scholasticism pure and undiluted. Historic-
ally it is fair to state that f heir ideas were a mingling
7 BEcKER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 57, 61.
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of many factors and influences. Bryce points out: 38
They had for their oracle of political philosophy
the treatise of Montesquieu on the Spirit of Laws,
which, published anonymously at Geneva forty
years before, had won its way to an immense
authority on both sides of the ocean... .. Of the
supposed influence of other Continental authors,
such as Rousseau, or even of English thinkers such
as Burke, there are few direct traces in the Federal
Constitution. . . . But ... abstract theories regard-
ing human rights had laid firm hold on the na-
tional mind. . . . The influence of France and her
philosophers belongs chiefly to the years succeeding
1789, when Jefferson, who was fortunately absent
in Paris during the Constitutional Convention,
headed the democratic propaganda.
From English sources they inherited the common law
tradition which was primarily Christian and scholastic,
although many of them also were influenced by Locke
whose ideas on happiness we have previously charac-
terized as a variety of theistic utilitarianism. It cannot
381 BRYCE, The American Commonwealth 29-30 (2d ed. 1911).
Compare Bzcxsa, op. cit. supra note 26, at 27. For evidence of scholastic
influence on the Founding Fathers, see the following pertinent references.
Figgis, On Some Political Theories of the Early Jesuits, 11 TRANSAC-
TIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY (N.S.) 94 (1897): "From the
Society of Jesus the theory passed to the English Whigs. Locke and Sid-
ney, if they did not take their political faith bodily from Suarez or Bel-
larmin, [sic] managed in a remarkable degree to conceal the differences
between the two." MCILWAIN, The Political Works of James I xxvii
(1918), in speaking of Bellarmine and his fellow Jesuits, stated: "At a
single glance it becomes obvious how much English theorists, for two cen-
turies and more owed to a party whom they dared not acknowledge."
HUNT, The Virginia Declaration of Rights and Cardinal Bellarmine, 3
CATHOLIC HISTORICAL REvIEw 276-89 (1917).
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be stated apodictically that the happiness philosophy
underlying the Declaration was derived from this or
that source alone. But we shall indicate some of the
doctrines about happiness as the end of government,
and happiness as a criterion of morality which appear
to have played a part in the political formation of the
founding fathers.
Happiness as the end of government is an ancient
idea, declares Julian P. Boyd, and it is embraced by
James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams,
George Mason, James Otis and a great number of the
contemporaries of Jefferson, to "say nothing of Burla-
maqui, Wollaston, Beccaria, Bolingbroke, and a friend
of Thomas Hobbes, John Hall. . . . "39 In fact it is
commonplace with scholastic writers, too, that temporal
felicity (as they term it, to make sure it will not be
confused.wiht beatitude) is the end of civil society. For
instance, in a typical manual, that of Nicholas Russo,
one finds the doctrine that the end of civil society is the
safety, prosperity and perfection of its citizens. The
state provides for their safety by making them secure in
life, liberty and property; it provides for their prosperity
by helping them according to their needs and abilities
to provide for themselves a supply of material goods; it
promotes the perfection of its citizens by supplying
means through which their bodily health, and mental
and moral faculties may be perfected. 4
0
The same general conception is found in Emerich de
Vattel's Law of Nations, which was a political manual
for John Adams, James Wlson, Thomas Jefferson and
39 BoYD, op. cit., supra note 30, at 4.
0 Russo, De Philosophia Morali 235 n.320 (1891).
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many of the revolutionary statesmen. Vattel teaches: 41
The end or aim of civil society is to procure for
its citizens the necessities, the comforts, and the
pleasures of life, and, in general, their happiness;
to secure to each the peaceful enjoyment of his
property and a sure means of obtaining justice;
and finally to defend the whole body against all
external violence....
John Adams may have been unconsciously drawing on
Vattel, whom he had studied, when he said: 42
Upon this point all speculative politicians will
agree, that the happiness of society is the end of
government, as all divine and moral philosophers
will agree that the happiness of the individual is
the end of man. From this principle it will follow
that the form of government which communicates
ease, comfort, security, or, in one word, happiness,
to the greatest number of persons, and in the great-
est degree, is the best.
The philosophy of nature and of natural law found
its way into the Colonies in the eighteenth century
through Americans educated abroad, and through the
works of Newton and Locke and their expositors, which
were available at Yale, Harvard and Princeton well
before the Declaration. 43 Furthermore the whole com-
mon law tradition of England, which was the basis of
41 VATTEL, Law of Nations, as quoted in BoYD, op. cit. supra note 30,
at 5 n.10. Boyd is of the opinion that this philosophy of Vattel, in which
human happiness and good politics are intermingled, stems from Leibnitz'
theory of human perfectibility which was adopted by Christian Frederich
Yon Wolff and digested and popularized by Vattel.
42 As quoted in BoYD, op. cit. supra note 30, at 4.
4s See BECKER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 74-5.
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colonial institutions, was a Christian, natural law
tradition.
John Hall, a friend of Hobbes, asserted the pursuit
of happiness as a natural right of the individual in
1651 in his work The Grounds and Reasons of Mon-
archy Considered, in these terms: 44
... my natural liberty, that is to say, to make my
life as justly happy and advantageous to me as I
can, he [the monarch] can no more give away from
me than my understanding and eyesight, for these
are privileges which God and nature hath endued
me with, and these I cannot be denyed, but by him
that will deny me a being.
The same point of view of the individual's right to
pursue his temporal happiness is implicit in the whole
conception of happiness and morality adopted by Locke,
and exemplified by such diverse writers as Blackstone,
Wilson, and Paley.
Blackstone, whose Commentaries had a wide circula-
tion in America after their first publication in 1765,
expounds the relation between natural law and happi-
ness as follows: 45
As, therefore, the Creator is a Being, not only of
infinite power, and wisdom, but also of infinite
goodness, He has been pleased so to contrive the
constitution and frame of humanity that we should
want no other prompter to inquire after and pursue
the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that
universal principle of action. For He has so inti-
44As quoted in BoYD, op. cit. supra note 30, at 4.
15 1 BL. COMM. *40.
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mately connected, so inseparably interwoven the
laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each
individual, that the latter [happiness of the indi-
vidual] cannot be attained but by observing the
former [laws of eternal justice]; and if the former
be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the lat-
ter. In consequence of which mutual connection of
justice and human felicity, He has not perplexed
the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted
rules and precepts . . . but has graciously reduced
the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept,
"that man shall pursue his own true and substan-
tial happiness." This is the foundation of what we
call ethics or natural law.
Of which excerpt I will only remark at this point that
it seems to make good and evil depend ultimately on
the will of God rather than on His nature, and that it
over-simplifies the norm of morality- to say the least.
A similar blending of theology, natural law and
happiness as a moral criterion appears to be expressed
in the following statement of James Wilson of Penn-
sylvania: 46
[God] being infinitely and eternally happy in
himself, his goodness alone could move him to
create us, and give us the means of happiness. The
same principle, that moved his creating, moves his
governing power. The rule of his government we
shall find to be reduced to this one paternal com-
mand - Let man pursue his own perfection and
happiness ....
46 WILSON, Of the Law of Nature in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WIL-
SON 99, 104, 105, (Andrews ed. 1895).
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...what is the efficient cause of moral obligation
- of the eminent distinction between right and
wrong? ...
S. .I give it this answer -the will of God. This
is the supreme law.
As a final example of this philosophical tendency
which was current when the founding fathers lived,
and which influenced their views on the pursuit of hap-
piness, let me quote an interesting application which
Paley makes of his theologico-utilitarian concept of hap-
piness. For though this was published after the Amer-
ican Revolution, yet it pre-supposes the same ideas that
underlay revolutionary thought. In fact it is particu-
larly apropos, as being a criticism of the Declaration
itself in the light of a philosophy of happiness taken
for granted by Paley with which Jefferson may have
agreed. Paley is discussing the grounds of civil obedi-
ence. He rejects any original contract or social compact
and assigns as "the only ground of the subject's obliga-
tion, THE WILL OF GOD AS COLLECTED FROM EXPEDI-
ENCE." He argues as follows: 47
"It is the will of God that the happiness of
human life be promoted:"- this is the first step,
and the foundation not only of this, but of every
moral conclusion.-"Civil society conduces to that
end:"-this is the second proposition.-"Civil
societies cannot be upholden, unless, in each, the
interest of the whole society be binding upon every
part and member of it:"- this is the third step,
and conducts us to the conclusion, namely, "that so
47 1 PALEY, Op. cit. supra note 22, 6.3.318.
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long as the interest of the whole society requires it,
that is, so long as the established government can-
not be resisted or changed without public incon-
venience, [i.e., public happiness] it is the will of
God (which will universally determines our duty)
that the established government be obeyed,"- and
no longer.
This principle being admitted, the justice of
every particular case of resistance is reduced to a
computation of the quality of the danger and griev-
ance on the one side, and of the probability and
expense of redressing it on the other.
But who shall judge this? We answer, "Every
man for himself."
Among the practical rules inferred from the general
one of public expediency, which largely coincides with
Locke's "public happiness," is this one: 48
"The interest of the whole society is binding
upon every part of it." No rule, short of this, will
provide for the stability of civil government, or for
the peace and safety of social life. Wherefore, as
individual members of the state are not permitted
to pursue their emolument to the prejudice of the
community, so it is equally a consequence of this
rule that no particular colony, province, town, or
district, can justly concert measures for their sep-
arate interest, which shall appear at the same time
to diminish the sum of prosperity [another name
for human happiness]. I do not mean that it is
49 1d., 6.3.322-3.
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necessary to the justice of a measure that it profit
each and every part of the community . . . ; but
what I affirm is, that those counsels can never be
reconciled with the obligations resulting from civil
union, which cause the whole happiness of the so-
ciety to be impaired for the convenience of a part.
This conclusion is applicable to the question of
right between Great Britain and her revolted
colonies. Had I been an American, I should not
have thought it enough to have had it even demon-
strated, that a separation from the parent state
would produce effects beneficial to America; my
relation to that [parent] state imposed on me a
farther inquiry, namely, whether the whole happi-
ness of the empire was likely to be promoted by
such a measure; not indeed the happiness of every
part; that was not necessary, nor to be expected;
-but whether what Great Britain would lose-by
the separation, was likely to be compensated to the
joint stock of happiness, by the advantages which
America would receive from it.
Paley is vague in this passage as to whether in his
opinion the Americans really had justice on their side.
The significance of the quotation, however, is to show
that for Paley, with whom Jefferson probably agreed,
the general happiness was the test. He was convinced
of that, although he might differ with others on the
question of fact, whether the American revolt would
result in a sufficiently greater happiness of a sufficiently
greater number of people to justify itself.
The possibility of misuse and abuse of such a doctrine
of happiness did not escape the profound mind of
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James Madison, who wrote to Monroe as follows: 49
There is no maxim, in my opinion, which is more
liable to be misapplied, and which, therefore, more
needs elucidation, than the current one, that the
interest of the majority is the political standard of
right and wrong. Taking the word "interest" as
synonymous with "ultimate happiness," in which
sense it is qualified with every necessary moral in-
gredient, the proposition is no doubt true. But tak-
ing it in the popular sense, as referring to immedi-
ate augmentation of property and wealth, nothing
could be more false. In the latter sense, it would be
the interest of the majority in every community to
despoil and enslave the minority of individuals.
III.
Critique of "Pursuit of Happiness" as a Natural Right
Now that we have had a bird's-eye view of general
theories of happiness, and have investigated, superficially
at least, some of the sources from which the founding
fathers drew their notions on happiness as the end of
civil society, and the right of the individual to pursue
his own happiness, we are in a position to see where this
philosophy fits into the general tradition, and to evaluate
from the viewpoint of scholasticism the meaning of the
proposition: "Man has a natural right to pursue hap-
piness."1
We saw that from the time of Descartes on, there
4B 1 MADISoN, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 250.1
(Congressional ed. 1884). Hence, the general welfare should not mean
the same thing as the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The
equality of man demands that the general welfare, not the greatest happi-
ness of the majority should control.
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was a definite tendency to divorce philosophy from the-
ology, and that many subsequent writers, even though
religious-minded men, were more interested in analyzing
and describing man's felicity in this life than in specu-
lating about the nature of beatitude. Furthermore, the
practical bent of the English mind betrayed itself in the
psychological approach to the question of man's felicity
on earth; a habit of mind which did not relish the
metaphysical reaches of Aristotelian thought. The
theories of happiness current in Jefferson's day, there-
fore, were theories of man's happiness in this life. And
so we must not imagine that the happiness of the Dec-
laration is the eudaimonia of Aristotle or the beatitudo
of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. It belongs in a dif-
ferent tradition. The pursuit of happiness in this life is
broad enough to include doubtless, the pursuit of eter-
nal happiness, and should include it, but the Declara-
tion is dealing with a philosophy of civil society,
which concerns itself directly with the temporal welfare
of the body politic, and the temporal felicity of its citi-
zens. It is the function of another order, the Church,
to provide directly the means of eternal happiness. The
state according to its scope and constitution confines
itself to temporal concerns.
But since so much of political theory deals with the
general welfare as the end of government the question
also arises whether the happiness of the Declaration
means the general happiness (welfare) of the body
politic or the happiness of individual men. It seems to
me to be clearly intended as individual happiness in
the phrase "pursuit of happiness." Just as every man
individually is endowed by his Creator with an inalien-
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able right to life and liberty- his own life, his own
liberty -, so each individual is endowed with the right
to pursue his own happiness here on earth. On the
other hand, at the end of the same paragraph there
appears the phrase "their safety and happiness." Here
it is the general happiness or general welfare that is in-
tended, because here the Declaration speaks of the right
"to institute new government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety
and happiness." It is the promotion of the general
happiness for which new governments are formed and
for which every government exists.
This theory is in substantial harmony with the scho-
lastic teaching of today. Victor Cathrein, s.j., one of
the most widely used of the modern manualists, pro-
pounds the following thesis: 50
The end of civil society is public prosperity, i.e.,
the sum of the conditions requisite so that as far as
possible all the organic members of society will be
able directly by themselves to achieve complete
temporal felicity, subordinated to their last end.
And among these conditions, the enjoyment of the
juridical order, as the natural structure of society
postulates, occupies the first place while in the sec-
ond place is a sufficient abundance of the goods
of soul and body which are necessary to achieve
the aforesaid felicity and which cannot be suffi-
ciently attained by private initiative.
Another author, in asserting that 'the specific proxi-
5
0
CATHREIN, Philosophia Moralis 391 n.516 (6a ed. 1907).
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mate end of civil society is the public good of peace
and prosperity, explains that the remoter, but still spe-
cific, end of the state is temporal felicity. "That the
remote end of the state is temporal perfect felicity we
assume from common sense and from the fact that man
tending towards such felicity and finding it impossible of
attainment in domestic society alone, institutes civil
society for the attainment of his perfect temporal fe-
licity." 51 Thus it appears to me that though there are
various formulas for expressing the idea, scholasticism is
in close harmony with the Declaration in its assertion of
temporal happiness as the end of government, and in
close harmony with the Preamble to the Constitution
which spells out this same temporal happiness.
But there are one or two points worth mentioning
where the natural law philosophy of some of the authors
we have quoted differs from that of scholasticism.
The first is the idea that the natural law is based on
the will of God, i.e., the free will of God. Apparently
Locke, and after him Paley, made right and wrong,
good and evil, depend solely on the will of God.52 Cer-
tainly from the quotation from Blackstone given above
one can infer that he considers the ultimate cause of the
distinction between right and wrong to be God's will.
James Wilson still more clearly asserts: " . . . what is
the efficient cause of moral obligation? -I give this
answer - the will of God. This is the supreme law." 5
Here we find confusion, it seems to me, of the two
51 Cox, Liberty: Its Use and Abvse 364 n.536 (2d ed. 1943).
52 Ct. FoW.ER, op. cit. supra note 20, at 153-4.
53 WILSON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 105.
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questions, what is the cause of moral obligation, and
what causes the difference between moral good and
moral evil. Scholastic philosophers dispute about the
cause of moral obligation, and many of them do invoke
the will of God as the ultimate reason why one is
obliged to choose good and shun evil,-but the will is
not God's free will. This, however, is not the same ques-
tion as what makes a good act good and an evil act evil.
The basis of this difference, Scholastics teach, is the
eternal nature of God, not His will, and especially not
His free will. The eternal law of God, universal and
unchangeable, is the expression of His very nature.
Man's participation in that law through natural reason
is called the natural law. Hence the dictates of natural
law, when properly formulated, are unchangeable, be-
cause they are based on the unchangeable nature of
God. It was because of the difficulty of this concept
and its practical application to moral problems that
there were so many disputes amongst the Schoolmen as
to what God could permit by way of dispensation or
exception, and what He could not permit as being en-
tirely contrary to His nature and to the nature of man.
Some of the eighteenth century philosophers who were
outside the scholastic tradition lost sight of this impor-
tant distinction. Pufendorf, a natural law philosopher
much read by the founding fathers, teaches that the
ultimate difference between good and evil must be
traced to the free will of God, but once God freely
decreed good and evil to be thus and thus the decree
was unchangeable.5
4
54 Cf. CATHREIN, op. cit. supra note 50, at 74 n. 78.
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The second point of difference between scholasticism
and the theories of the eighteenth century is akin to the
first. The happiness philosophy of Locke and Paley,
and presumably of Jefferson, Adams and others, was a
kind of theistic utilitarianism: theistic because based on
God's will; utilitarian because temporal happiness was
made the measure and criterion of human morality. As
Wilson stated it: "The rule of his [God's] government
we shall find to be reduced to this one paternal com-
mand - Let man pursue his own perfection and happi-
ness." 55 God's will makes things good or evil. But His
goodness has led Him to contrive things in such wise
that happiness and good coincide - even on earth. Con-
sequently by computing happiness (temporal felicity)
according to quantity, or quality, or extent, or all these
combined, one has a measure of goodness or evil. In
other words the norm of morality is the usefulness of
human conduct in producing temporal felicity either of
the individual or of the generality.
Scholasticism teaches, of course, that the good and
the ultimate good coincide with beatitude, or eternal
happiness. But only in a severely limited sense can we
say that human felicity is the measure of the good life
on earth. Generally speaking, perhaps, the man who
observes the moral law has a better chance of achieving
felicity on earth than the man who flouts that law. But
as far as observation unmistakably teaches us, that is
not universally so. There are so many exceptions, that
temporal felicity cannot be the essential criterion in
spite of the fact that the sinner often pays for his sins in
55 WILSON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 99.
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this life, and that nature, as it were, frequently avenges
herself on those who rebel against her injunctions.56
But this is not the place to refute this type of utili-
tarianism. It is enough for our purpose merely to point
out that the norm of morality according to the Scholas-
tics is not temporal felicity or any other utilitarian ideal,
but human nature itself. Thus the true measure and
criterion of a human act is a comparison of it with
human nature as a whole, viewed in its relations to self,
to one's neighbor, and to God. Hence right reason, the
natural law, may sometimes demand painful sacrifices
which in this life will have no reward. This realistic
point of view recognizes that the good are often un-
happy in this life and the evil happy, or at least that the
good are not as happy as the evil appear to be.
And so finally we come to the question: Has man a
natural law right to happiness in this life? - or at least
has he a natural right to pursue temporal felicity? And
let us use the term temporal felicity in the same con-
notation as Paley - preponderance of pleasure over
pain, understanding that both pleasure and pain are of
the body, mind and soul - not that I consider this the
only or the best way of describing temporal happiness.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say with Janet:
"Happiness is not, as Bentham claims, the greatest pos-
56 Compare BUTLER, Sermon XII, Upon the Love of Our Neighbor
in 2 THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER 226 (Gladstone ed. 1896). "As we
are not competent judges, what is upon the whole for the good of the
world, there may be other immediate ends appointed us to pursue, besides
that one of doing good, or producing happiness. . . . For there are certain
dispositions of mind, and certain actions, which are in themselves ap-
proved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from the consideration of
their tendency to the happiness or misery of the world .... "
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sible sum of pleasure: it is the highest possible state of
excellence, from whence results the most excellent pleas-
ure." 57 In other words it would be philosophically
more accurate to describe even temporal happiness in
Plato's terms of the well-doing (eupraxia) of man's
higher faculties, which has as its natural concomitant an
efflorescence of pleasure. But in speaking of a pre-
ponderance of pleasure over pain we at least call atten-
tion to the relative and incomplete character of earthly
happiness and provide a rough measurement of what is
meant by happiness on earth. Nor does this by any
means exclude the hope of heaven as an element of that
comparative freedom from pain, comparative excellence
of functioning, and comparative peace of mind that de-
serve to be called happiness here below.
I find it impossible to show that all men have a right
to the actual attainment of this kind of happiness on
earth, for these reasons: First, there is no such absolute
right because there are circumstances in which the ob-
servance of the moral law results in unhappiness for
this or that individual. Yet the individual has no right
to achieve his happiness at the expense of the moral law.
Secondly, neither reason nor revelation promises us an
infallible reward of earthly happiness in return for ob-
servance of the natural law; nor is there anything in-
herent in the nature of things which prevents me from
admitting that life is inevitably unhappy for many
people. In fact the doctrine of original sin and its con-
sequences prepares us for much human misery not per-
sonally deserved. Thirdly, human experience shows
57JANET, The Theory of Morals 77 (1894).
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that many people who without blame on their part, and
without any injustice on the part of others, are destined
to live unhappy lives. Each one of us can think of many
instances, but the example that comes to my mind are
the thousands upon thousands of mentally ill. If these
sufferers have an absolute right to actual happiness
here on earth then someone is doing them a grave in-
justice. Is it man? No one can point to the man. Is it
God? Absit. Fourthly, we see so much of the I-have-a-
right-to-be-happy philosophy and to what it leads
amongst the heroes and heroines of fiction as well as the
less heroic characters of real life, that we cannot help
but be skeptical as to the existence of any such right.
Men are undoubtedly meant by nature to be happy.
They are made for it. And if they observe nature's laws
their chances of achieving comparative happiness even
in this life are good. (But I have heard a very wise man
say that there are no happy lives; there are only happy
days.) Furthermore no one will be deprived of eternal
happiness except by his own fault. But have all men a
right from nature to achieve actual happiness on earth?
Neither experience, nor philosophy, nor revelation war-
rant the assertion of such a right.
But the right to pursue temporal happiness is another
matter. That all men have a right to seek the happiness
of this world, subject to the dictates of the moral law,
and in subordination to their final end, is a proposition
so clear that to establish it is to labor the obvious.
First of all, temporal happiness is a good worth hav-
ing; it is a thing of true value. Even the Stoics recog-
nized this, but sought their human felicity in an attempt
to eliminate sensuous pleasures entirely. Certainly
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neither scholastic philosophy nor Christian asceticism
will tolerate the idea that human pleasures whether of
body or soul are something evil in themselves, and to be
shunned.58 Even St. Augustine, the ascetic and philoso-
pher of the City of God, enumerates the good things of
the earthly city that constitute its blessedness here
below.59 This relation between humanism and the
ascetical ideals of Christianity could be elaborated at
great length.
Secondly, temporal happiness is a good specifically
proper to'man because the universal instinct of all men
is to seek earthly happiness, to shun pain and sorrow,
to achieve the peace, contentment and the "well-doing"
that befit mankind. Only the most intolerable and irra-
tional pessimism would deny this instinct its scope. Only
an insane or upside down philosophy will hold that
such a tendency is evil. Its existence is compelling proof
that man has a right to seek earthly happiness. For the
purposes of illustration this right can be compared with
the inherent right which, according to the Scholastics,
all men have in relation to property (though in fact it
is much more obvious and much more fundamental
than that right). Everyone has a right to acquire own-
ership of property. But not everyone has actual owner-
ship. Furthermore those who have not, have no right
to acquire property by hook and by crook. So too,
everyone has an inherent right to pursue temporal hap-
piness, but those who are without it have no right to
58Cf. TRINKEAUS, Adversity's NMblemen: The Italian Humanists on
Happiness (1940) passim.
69 ST. AuoUSTINz, De Civitate Dei 22.24, as translated in 2 DoDs, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 522 et seq.
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attempt to acquire it at the expense of the rights of
others or in violation of the natural law. Finally, if we
examine more in particular what the conditions of this
happiness are, they will generally resolve themselves into
elements and values which admittedly are objects of nat-
ural rights, such as life, liberty, property, and the rest.
Scholastic philosophy and Catholic teaching there-
fore, as stated above,60 recognize:
* . the possibility of a relative and incomplete
happiness in this life, and its value; but it insists
.on the importance of self-restraint, detachment and
control of the particular faculties and appetites
for the attainment of this limited happiness, and
still more, in order to secure that eternal well-being
be not sacrificed for the sake of some transitory
enjoyment.
And so the "pursuit of happiness," as it appears in
the Declaration of Independence, has little to do with
the eudaimonia of Aristotle or the beatitudo of scholas-
ticism. It is concerned with temporal felicity conceived
along more practical lines. Indeed, one of the philo-
sophical currents which appears to have influenced it is
a type of theistic utilitarianism which scholastic philos-
ophy rejects. Nevertheless, no matter what its sources
- and we have seen how varied and mingled they were
- as it stands, it is a statement of natural law right
entirely in accord with scholastic theory. For it does not
assert an absolute right which all men have to the ac-
tual achivement of happiness in this life, but rather
6o See note 25 supra.
THE RIGHT TO PURSUE HAPPINESS
records the self-evident proposition that the right to
seek happiness here below is part of man's very nature.
When Augustine was writing The City of God, dis-
coursing tranquilly on the nature of happiness, the
northern barbarian invaders were overrunning the civ-
ilization of Rome. Today when our own civilization is
threatened, not only from without by similar oncoming
hordes, but from within by some who share the mate-
rialistic philosophy of the aggressor, it may seem unduly
academic to discourse upon the pursuit of happiness.
But happiness is not really academic with any of us. It
is our daily preoccupation. Let us thank God, then, that
our right to pursue it as human beings, clothed with
the dignity that belongs to every human, is protected
by the fundamental laws and principles and institutions
of the beloved land in which we live.
Civilizations live and die by principles. If the prin-
ciples of the Declaration of Independence were a mere
tinsel of glittering generalities, our American civiliza-
tion would not have survived to this day. For at the
bottom of every human problem, and at the bottom of
every political problem, there always lies a theological
problem. Who is God? What is He like? Who is man?
What is his nature? Is God his destiny?
The founding fathers of this republic had definite
answers in their minds to these questions, answers which
though not in entire agreement with Catholic faith and
scholastic tradition, yet were substantially the truths of
the Christian religion and of natural religion. These
answers were reflected in their political philosophy.
Their house was not built on sand, because their prin-
ciples were true. Those principles recognized man for
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what he is, a creature of God, endowed by God with
certain natural rights, and among these, the right to
pursue his happiness here on earth.
Our views on happiness are inevitably shaped by our
views on these fundamental theological issues. If man
is mere matter, his only happiness is the pleasure of this
life, whether higher or lower. If man is only a bundle
of reflexes and reactions, then his happiness is nothing
more than that "adequate adjustment to environment"
which is the goal of psychiatry and mental hygiene.
But if man is a creature of body and spirit, with the
supernatural beatific vision of God as his immortal
destiny, then the happiness of this life must be but a
shadow of that which is to come; and the agonies of
the human heart which besiege us on all sides begin to
have some meaning and explanation. Neither this hap-
piness nor those agonies are academic.
What does the City of God say about them?
Augustine asserts: 61
. . . that life eternal is the supreme good, death
eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain the one
and escape the other we must live rightly. And
thus it is written, "The just [man] lives by faith,"
(Heb. ii. 4) for we do not as yet see our good, and
must therefore live by faith; neither have we in
ourselves power to live rightly, but can do so only
if He who has given us faith to believe in His help
do help us when we believe and pray.
61 ST. AUOUSTINE, De Civitate Dei 19.4.1, as translated in 2 DODS,
op. cit, supra note 5, at 301-2.
